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The Voter-Poll Worker Relationship
and Customer Satisfaction - - - - - - - - - .
Ashley Erickson, Amy La Monica, Steven A. Snell, and Patrick Spencer

~

e 2000 presidential election highlighted several weaknesses in America's electoral process. Long lines, indetenninable ballots, allegations of vote fraud, and an inability to produce fast and accurate vote results will forever
distinguish the Bush-Gore contest. In the aftermath
of this election meltdown, Congress passed the Help
America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). This act was designed to fix electoral problems by standardizing provisional voting, mandating statewide voter registration
lists, and effectively banning punch cards and lever voting systems. When Congress passed HAVA, it simultaneously established the Election Assistance Commission
(EAC) to distribute HAVA funds and ensure each state's
compliance. The states were given large discretion in their
employment of federal funds and their compliance with
HAVA's minimal standards. The compliance deadlines
that HAVA established for these changes expired earlier
this year [2007]. I
Utah readily met these deadlines. First, under the direction of Lieutenant Governor alene Walker and finally under Lieutenant Governor Gary Herbert, Utah organized an
implementation committee and developed a four-year plan
to confonn to HAVA requirements. The planning committee budgeted more than twenty million dollars for the acquisition of new Diebold touch-screen machines. 2 To better
accommodate the limited number of voting machines, Utah
adopted no-excuse early voting. Lieutenant Governor Herbert's office also invested heavily in a voter education campaign. In the first general election since the implementation
of final HAVA requirements, Utah experienced minimal
complications. The grossest irregularity, a problem with the
touch-screen voting machine's card encoder, was confined
to Utah County and quickly remedied. 3

Other states that met HAVA's requirements were not as
fortunate as Utah. In Maryland's September primary, voters
encountered numerous barriers as they tried to cast their ballots. In some polling locations registration databases failed,
voting equipment malfunctioned, precincts ran out of provisional ballots, and voters endured long lines as precinct
hours were extended long into the night. As a result ofthese
complications, voters were lost in a maze of errors, especially as some voters had to cast votes on makeshift ballots
of plain paper, because the poll workers did not know what
to do after they ran out of provisional ballots}
The difference between Utah's and Mary land's voting
experiences cannot be explained by HAVA itself because
both states complied with the same federal guidelines.
The disparity between these experiences could be the
product of each state's implementation, but this is also
not likely since the two states, both with touch-screen
voting machines, provisional ballots, and statewide
databases, had much in common. The source of these
disparities must lie not in the laws, but in the application
of these laws. HAVA, conceived at the federal level and
uniquely applied to each state, trickled down to county
governments as a fully fonned and all-encompassing
election refonn package. This top-down process required
counties to master new election procedures and to train poll
workers to operate new equipment, correctly administer
provisional ballots, and apply other newly established
practices. Perhaps the poll workers bear the heaviest
burden of election refonn, because they are the ones
that apply HAVA on a voter-by-voter basis. Though they
received little news coverage before the 2000 election,
poll workers now find themselves at the epicenter of postHAVA election disasters.
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In this paper, we discuss the importance of poll
workers in applying HAVA. We believe they have a central
role in defining the voting experience. Because the election
reforms have been most taxing on poll workers, we posit
that voters may reasonably judge their post-HAVA voting
experience by their interaction with poll workers at their
precinct. Employing the voters' judgments of poll workers
as a measure of their customer satisfaction, our research
investigates what factors lead to a positive rating of poll
workers and the voting experience.

Poll Workers Shape and Sell the Voting Experience
The interaction between a citizen and his legislator,
Michael Lipsky argues, is not nearly as important as the
interaction between the citizen and society's street-level
bureaucrats, which includes teachers, police officers, and
welfare workers.s Lipsky gives them this title because they
are the agents who, on behalf of the government, interpret
and implement federal, state, and local laws on a daily basis. Common people are more directly affected by the immediate decisions of these makeshift legislators than they
are by the official policymakers who pass down the laws.
According to Lipsky, the "decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out,"6 These
unofficial policies have the potential to profoundly impact
the lives of the citizens under the jurisdiction of streetlevel bureaucrats. Lipsky sets forth that street-level bureaucrats "implicitly mediate aspects of the constitutional
relationship of citizens to the state."7 Scholars have more
recently applied Lipsky's title of street-level bureaucrats
to election officials. David Kimball and Martha Kropf
grant this status of unofficial policymaker to state and local election workers and argue that election administrators
playa key role in linking the government to its citizens.s
They find that experiences that should be similar across
precincts-especially under the uniform requirements of
HAVA-vary because of differences in state laws, voting
technology, size of jurisdictions, diverse populations, and
different cultural norms. 9 Kimball and Kropf are especially
interested in the electoral differences that are the products
of partisan election officials. They conjecture that Democratic election officials are more likely to apply election
law in a way that fosters increased voter turnout, while
Republicans engage in activities like purging voter lists
to reduce turnout. 1O As the process of choosing election
officials varies by state, Kimball and Kropf hypothesize
that partisanship and political contests can deter fair and
even applications of election law. They suggest that public opinion most strongly favors a uniform, nonpartisan
method of selecting election officials. Nevertheless, they
refrain from endorsing any particular method because they
do not agree that nonpartisanship guarantees accountabil2

ity. Instead, they recommend further study of the methods
of choosing election officials and the resulting neutrality
and accountability of such officials. II
Anna Bassi, Rebecca Morton, and Jessica Trounstine
are also concerned with the policy-making powers of election officials. I" Bassi, et af. concur with Kimball and Kropf
that election officials, as street-level bureaucrats, are positioned to inappropriately grant and deny voting rights. In
their discussion of disenfranchisement, Bassi, et af. argue
that problems arise when states try to apply different laws
and administrative systems. This allows room for error in
the enforcement of the laws and regulations regarding voting rights for felons. States may even have identical laws
but differ in their enforcement of these laws and policies.
Bassi, et af. show how common this error is by reviewing surveys and interviews with election officials, many of
which show that even the election officials fail to properly
answer questions about their state's felon disenfranchisement laws. \3 They argue that eleCtion monitoring is most
important when the election environment is not competitive because such an environment escapes the public scrutiny of a more competitive election. They find that there
is significantly less fluctuation within the application of
disenfranchisement laws when elections are competitive.
Election monitoring is important in the absence of competition to ensure that election workers are applying the laws
consistently, especially in the authors' example of felon
disenfranchisement. Monitoring and competition limit the
subjectivity that election officials invoke when making
policy decisions.
Thad Hall, Quin Monson, and Kelly Patterson extend
the idea of election officials as street-level bureaucrats
to entail poll workers as well. Hall. et af. find that poll
workers must be street-level bureaucrats because they
are the governmental agents that make the final decisions
that determine the voters' election experience. 14 That is.
after federal, state, and county legislators have made the
laws and regulations that decide how elections are to be
carried out, poll workers are the ones who implement
these laws and actually interact with the voters. Hall. et al.
state that "poll workers bridge the gap between what the
government intends and what the citizen experiences."15
Since the implementation of HAVA brought about many
reforms-and consequently, many new opportunities to
exercise personal discretion in administering election
law-poll workers are more important than ever. Their
most significant finding is that the voters' perception
of poll workers affects their confidence in the electoral
process. Hall, et al. also find that views of poll workers
help determine the confidence voters have that their vote
will be counted accurately and the overall satisfaction that
they feel with the present state of democracy. They derive
these conclusions by examining data from the Utah Voter
Poll, an Internet survey conducted after the 2004 general
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election. They then weighted the results to be consistent
with the demographic breakdown of the 2004 Utah Colleges
Exit Poll.16
We are interested in the conclusion made by Hall, et al.
that voters who rated their poll worker as excellent are
"more likely to express more confidence in the process
and more satisfaction with democracy, "because it highlights a weakness in HAVA."17 Namely, the many reforms
that the legislation imposed on states and counties may
have no affect on voter confidence if the poll workers
fumble and clumsily apply the reforms. Hall, et al. do not,
however, address the voter-poll worker relationship. Because they found a significant and consistent relationship
between the voters' assessment of poll workers and voters' confidence in the electoral system. We hope to expand
on their work by highlighting the factors that make voters
think more favorably of their poll workers. We want to
know what makes voters give their poll workers positive
marks because those marks lead to confidence in the system, one ofHAVA's chief aims.
We agree with Hall, et al. that poll workers are critical in the voters' perceptions of the fairness and accuracy
of the elections. This theory descends logically from the
literature surrounding street-level bureaucracy. Voters
reasonably link poll worker performance to the quality of
elections because poll workers, as street-level bureaucrats,
shape the voting experience. We build upon this causal
story that poll worker performance affects voters' perceptions of elections by suggesting that the marks that voters give their poll workers are actually customer service
judgments. That is, we view poll workers not only as
street-level bureaucrats, but also as the sales associates responsible for selling the post-HAVA voting experience. A
voter who says that poll workers were excellent is pleased
with the service provided by her poll workers and can be
considered a happy customer while a voter who deems
his poll workers' performance is less than excellent is not
a fully satisfied customer. To make sense of these judgments, we tum to business journals and other studies of
customer satisfaction.
Thomas O. Jones and W. Earl Sasser. Jr. discuss the
concepts of satisfaction and the essential principles of
customer service and identify three main factors of good
service, including, I) turning around or fixing negative
customer experiences, 2) providing information that makes
the product easier to use, and 3) customizing the service
to fit each individual's specific needs. lg Since these areas
of customer satisfaction closely correspond to the voterpoll worker relationship, we are interested in the authors'
distinction between completely satisfied customers and
those who are only partially satisfied. Jones and Sasser find
that a completely satisfied customer thinks the product fits
their needs exactly and the customer service exceeds their
expectations. On the other hand, customers who say they
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are only satisfied with the services they receive are quite
different than the completely satisfied customer in that they
view the product as reasonably good, but find that one or
several aspects of the company's service did not meet
expectations. The authors reason that these customers
refrain from selecting a lower level of satisfaction because
they feel some level of sympathy towards the company and
its lackluster service. 19 Given this distinction, we hope to
explain the difference in customer service between voters
who said their poll workers were excellent and those who
said their poll workers were less than excellent.
In their research on customer satisfaction, Christian
Homburg, Nicole Koschate, and Wayne Hoyer discuss
the weight consumers give to these two methods in their
final determination of satisfaction.20 By studying students' responses to a new CD-ROM study guide, they
show that when first exposed to a new product, though
the students express their views in cognitive terms, the
emotional response has a more significant effect on their
assessment. However, over time the weight of affect decreases because consumers gain more information about
the product and thus make increasingly educated and
cognitive judgments. 21 We find their conclusions very
applicable to our study of Utah voters' judgments of poll
workers because the product, or experience that voters
had with their poll workers in the 2006 election, was unlike any previous election that they have participated in.
Adopting this dynamic model of customer satisfaction
we seek to measure the importance of affect, or emotional response, in the job performance ratings that voters assign their poll workers.

Data and Methodology
It is certainly true that the 2006 voting experience
was unlike any previous election. There was such wide
consensus on this matter that the 2006 Utah Colleges
Exit Poll dedicated an entire questionnaire to measure
the voter experience in this first round of elections since
Utah fully complied with HAVA's many requirements.
Every fifth voter selected to participate in the poll
received this specialized questionnaire that asked about
voter check-in, the voter's experience with the new touch
screen machines, and their interaction with poll workers.
Most important to our study, this questionnaire included a
replicate ofthe question that Hall, et al. asked participants
in the Utah Voter Poll about the poll workers. It reads:

• Please rate thejob peiformance of the pol/workers at
your precinct today. Excellent, Good, Fair, or Poor
This question, which served as the chief independent variable in the Hall, et al. paper, serves as our dependent variable. We view the voters' responses to this
question as a measure of their satisfaction with the new
product, the voting experience as presented to the voters
by their poll workers. This question is consistent with
3
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customer satisfaction studies and is a generally accepted
measure of satisfaction. 22
In accordance with the Homburg, et al. model of dynamic customer satisfaction, we hypothesize that because
the 2006 election cycle was the first since HAVA's full
implementation, voters will rely heavily on their emotional responses when evaluating their poll workers. We
consider the 2006 voting experience to be a new product,
since the voters lack prior experience necessary to provide
a cognitive evaluation of customer satisfaction, we expect
that affect will play a greater role in the voters' level of
customer satisfaction.
We draw measures of customer satisfaction and voter
affect from the election-day exit poll data. We made some
slight adjustments to the survey question above in order to
simplify the analysis of customer satisfaction. More specifically, we collapsed the four-point scale of poll worker
job performance into a dichotomous variable. Consistent
with the findings of Thomas Jones and W. Earl Sasser,
we grouped the voters who said their poll workers were
good with the respondents who called their poll workers
fair or poor. Given Jones and Sasser's findings about customers who said they were merely satisfied instead of
completely satisfied, we feel that voters who called their
poll workers good were more like the voters who said
the poll workers were fair or poor than those who afforded
their poll workers excellent marks.
We derive our chief independent variable, our measure of affect, from the question about the voter-poll
worker relationship. Though we originally wanted to ask
a short series of questions to unravel this relationship,
space limitations required us to concentrate our measure
of the relationship in a single question. We modified a
question that the Utah Colleges Exit Poll asked in the
June primary so it would speak only to personal relationships between voters and poll workers. The November
questionnaire asked:
• Did you personally know any of the poll workers at
your precinct today? Yes or no
By removing the June language about recognizing
a poll worker and by underlining the words personally
know, we hoped to filter out the respondents who did not
have a strong enough relationship with the poll worker
to merit any affective consideration of that poll worker's
job performance.
Using the two questions above as our primary
independent and dependent variables, we employ a logistic
regression model. We include other independent variables
that we believe might affect voters' perceptions of poll
workers. The first voter satisfaction control variable is a
dichotomous measure of whether or not the poll workers
asked the voter to present identification before voting.
Utah law has minimal 10 requirements, such that a
4

majority of regular in-person voters would not be required
to show lD. We do not know what effect this voter-poll
worker interaction will have on customer satisfaction, but
we feel that it is important to include this variable as a
control because the identification process is the voter's
initial encounter with poll workers.
We also include a question of whether voters asked
for help. Because we are trying to measure how the voter
perceives the poll workers' performance, it seems necessary to differentiate between the voters who sought
out customer service and those who were more passive.
Since most of the people that asked for help also said
they got the help they requested, we anticipate that voters who asked for help will be more likely to positively
assess their poll workers.
Our next set of variables comes from a matrix of
questions on the voter satisfaction survey. The questionnaire asked voters to indicate how strongly they agreed
or disagreed with statements about the voting machine instructions, the ease of machine use, the time required to
vote, and the privacy they felt while voting. We include
these questions to control for voters who gave their poll
workers bad marks because they had a generally poor experience at the polls.
Homburg, et al. said that affect is important when a
product is new, but cognitive assessments of the service
and product are always important. There is not a perfect
measure of cognition on the voter satisfaction survey,
but we control for a series of questions that asked voters
to make cognitive judgments about specific aspects of
their interaction with the poll workers. This series asks
voters to agree or disagree with statements like the poll
workers knew what they were doing, the poll workers
were helpful and respectful, and the poll workers knew
how to operate the voting machines. Because all of these
statements are positive views of the poll workers, we
collapsed the set into an index with a minimum value
of zero, when the voter strongly disagrees with all four
statements, and a maximum value of one, when the voter
strongly agrees with all four statements. We expect that
voters who gave their poll workers high marks on these
statements will be more likely to call their poll workers'
general performance excellent. Still, we expect that the
affect associated with a personal relationship will remain
significant when we control for this cognition.
As a final control, we include a series of demographic
questions that we believe are relevant to voters' opinions
of poll workers. We include dummy variables for
partisanship: democrats are the baseline while republicans
and independents are explicitly named in the model. We
also added a measure of religion. Our model has dummy
variables for active Latter-day Saints, inactive Latter-day
Saints, active members of other religions, and inactive
members of other religions. This leaves the nonreligious
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voters as our baseline in the religion analysis. We include
a recoded gender variable that sets females as our base
group. We also control for age and education level. Our
measure of age is derived from each respondent's selfreported year of birth. We maintain the intervals and
direction of the six-point education scale. but subtract
one from each value so that voters with only an eighth
grade education or less. our reference group, receive a
value of zero.
We include in Appendix I the question wording for
each of our variables as stated on the Utah Colleges Exit
Poll questionnaire. and Appendix 2 contains summary
statistics of each of these variables.

LOGIT

STANDARD

COEFFICIENT

ERROR

I personally knew a poll worker

0.833

0.184

0.000

Index of cognitive judgments

2.473

0.336

0.000

Voter asked for help with machine 0.858

0.261

0.001

Poll worker asked to see ID

0.340

0.247

0.168

Instructions for machine
were confllsing

-0.029

0.089

0.747

Machines were easy to use

-0.186

0.094

0.049

Too much time to vote

-0.274

0.095

0.004

I felt like I voted in privacy

0.007

0.063

0.915

0.103

0.292

0.725

Data Analysis

Inactive Latter-day Saint

-0.538

0.402

0.180

Before examining the complexities of our logistic
regression model, we offer some simple statements
about our variables and the interactions between them. In
general, most voters had very favorable views of their poll
workers. Almost 80 percent of election-day voters said the
poll workers at their precinct did an excellent job. A vast
majority of the dissenters said their workers did a good
job and the remaining 1.6 percent of respondents said their
poll workers did a fair or poor job. A crosstab with our
chief independent variable reveals the following:

Active in other religion

-0.429

0.370

0.246

Inactive in other religion

-0.925

0.466

0.047

Republican

-0.223

0.237

0.346

Independent

-0.696

0.317

0.028

Age

0.017

0.006

0.004

Gender (male=l, female=O)

-0.067

0.170

0.693

Yes
Less than excellent
Excellent
Total

N

No

12.2%

27.3%

87.il%

72.7%

716

884

That is, the 44.6 percent of voters who said they
personally knew their poll workers were more likely to
say their poll workers did an excellent job. The table above
shows a 15 percentage point jump in rating poll workers as
excellent when the voter personally knows a poll worker
at the precinct. This is the relationship we hope to learn
more about in our logistic regression model.
Evaluating the model as a whole, there are some
very important findings with regard to the voter-poll
worker relationship. Though the model highlights some
counterintuitive relationships, which we discuss at length
below. it accurately predicts about 80 percent of the cases.
Our fulliogit model has a Cox and Snell R-square of .129
and a Nagelkerke R-square of .207, which means our model
explains somewhere between 13 percent and 20 percent of
the variance in the voters' assessments of poll workers.
(The model produces the results shown in the next chart.)
We see that the three variables that we predicted
to have a positive effect on voters' assessment of poll
workers-the measures of personal relationship. the
index. and the measure of whether the voter asked for
help-all have the anticipated effect. Furthennore, these

SPENCER

SIGNIFICANCE

Active Latter-day Saint

Know Poll Workers at
Your Precinct

PArRICK

Educational attainment

0.219

0.089

0.013

Constant

-1.667

0.603

0.006

Note: Dependent variable: poll working rating.

three variables are each statistically significant at the 99
percent confidence level. That means that knowing a poll
worker at your precinct, asking for help, and agreeing
with a series of positive statements about the poll workers
leads to an excellent rating of poll workers. Voters who
were asked to present ID were also more likely to say their
poll workers were excellent, but this relationship is only
significant at the 80 percent confidence level.
When all factors are held at their mean values, the
predicted probability of rating the poll workers as excellent
is an impressive .85. If all other factors are maintained at
their mean values, but the voter does not know any of the
poll workers at the precinct, the predicted probability falls
to .79. However, if the voter knows a poll worker at the
precinct and all other factors are at their mean value, the
predicted probability of calling the poll workers excellent
increases to .89-a sizable jump. This probability further
climbs to .97 when the voter knows the poll worker, gives
their workers the highest marks on the cognitive index,
asks for help, and presents ID to the poll worker. When
these four variables are held at zero, the model predicts
that the probability of rating the poll workers as excellent
plummets to .24. Nevertheless, this last estimate seems to
be too conservative because fifteen of the sixteen voters in
the sample who actually received a zero value for each of
these variables still said their poll workers did an excellent
job. This highlights how our model does a better job at
predicting excellent ratings-we accurately predict about
96 percent of cases where voters say poll workers were
5
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excellent-than the less than excellent ratings, which our
model accurately predicts only 13 percent of the time.
Other findings from the logistic regression show that
voters who said the instructions for using the machines
were confusing and voters that said it took too much
time to vote are less likely to say their poll workers were
excellent. This is a likely story because these voters could
reasonably attribute some of their confusion and long time
spent at the polls to poll worker inefficiency. We note that
while the first variable lacks significance at any standard
level, the second is statistically significant beyond the 99
percent level. Voters who agreed that they felt like they
voted in privacy were also more likely to say the poll
workers did an excellent job, but this finding is called into
question by its very low significance level.
The final question in this series of control variables
yields a statistically significant but counterintuitive result. There is a strange negative relationship that exists
when voters agree that the voting machines were easy
to use. Voters are for some reason less likely to call their
poll workers excellent. We thought that this relationship
might be negative because voters who had no trouble with
the machines probably did not ask for help and therefore
had less interaction with the poll workers; however, this
explanation fails because our model already controls for
whether or not the voter asked for help. We modified our
model several times-omitting or adding different variables each time-but this negative relationship remained.
The demographic controls also have strange relationships. An increase in age or education level makes a voter
more likely to deem the poll workers' performance as excellent. These relationships are both highly, statistically significant. However, males seem to be less willing than women to
call their poll workers excellent and only active Latter-day
Saints are more likely than voters with no religious preference to call their poll workers excellent. The most peculiar
finding in the demographic controls is that republicans and
independents were less likely than democrats to call their
poll workers excellent. Though only the relationship of independents was statistically significant. we were surprised
to find that democrats, a longtime minority in Utah, would
be more likely than independents or republicans to call poll
workers excellent because virtually all of the elections in
Utah are managed by republican county governments.

Discussion
In order to account for the strange relationship of
partisan identification on the voters' perception of poll
workers, and in an effort to show a positive relationship
between ease of using the voting machines and the perceived poll worker performance, we tested the correlation of all of the variables in the model. A full table of
these correlations is included in Appendix 3. We suspected
that identifying as a republican might correlate very
6

strongly with being an active Latter-day Saint; however,
this relationship-the strongest in our model-has less
than a .50 correlation. Therefore, we feel confident that
controlling for partisanship and religious identification
does not introduce multicollinearity into the model.
We found some profound irregularities in the
series of questions pertaining to specific aspects of poll
worker performance: a significant number of voters who
strongly disagreed with the positive statements about
poll workers surprisingly said that their poll workers
did an excellent job. We performed crosstabs of these
agree/disagree statements with many other questions on
the voter satisfaction survey. We found that voters who
strongly disagreed with the questions in the poll worker
matrix were most similar to the respondents who strongly
agreed with the same statements. From these findings,
we are inclined to say that the matrix of specific poll
worker judgments has greater error than the stand-alone
job performance question because the respondents had
response set problems. It may be that many respondents
did not read the instructions for the matrix closely and as
a result marked the extreme responses that they assumed
to be positive when they were in fact choosing the most
negative options. To mitigate some of this error and to
simplify our analysis we collapsed this matrix into a single
index. Voters who strongly agreed with all four statements
received a value of one, those who strongly disagreed
with all statements were coded as a zero, and voters who
gave mixed responses accordingly received some value
between zero and one.
We were also concerned that our model might have
endogeneity, because we use an index of specific poll
worker judgments to explain whether voters think overall
poll worker performance is excellent. The correlation
between the poll worker index and the voters' judgment of
overall job performance is indeed statistically significant
at .0 I level, but the Pearson Correlation measure is less
than .20. Removing the poll worker index from the logistic
regression model slightly diminishes the R-square, but it
also reverses the signs of the repUblican dummy variable
and the dummy variable for active Latter-day Saints.
Since these newly reversed relationships still fail to reach
standard thresholds of statistical significance, we think the
cost of losing this information in our analysis outweighs
the benefit of reversing the partisan effect.
In order to more clearly explain the voter-poll worker
relationship, we recommend that future researchers make
use of additional measures of affect. We also recommend
that future surveys break down the statements about
specific aspects of poll worker performance into standalone questions or otherwise improve the matrix format by
alternating the direction of the statements. We predict that
either improvement would decrease response set issues
with that matrix.
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Conclusion
The final implementation of HAVA has delegated
new and diverse responsibilities to poll workers. Surely
the reforms have been taxing on Utah's poll workers,
an older group---with a median age of fifty-nine. Less
than 50 percent of Utah's poll workers say they are very
comfortable using computers. As street-level bureaucrats,
this group had to adapt to new policies by mastering new
voting equipment procedures, applying provisional ballot
laws, and implementing new state procedures for verifYing
voter identification. Overall, voters gave their poll workers
high marks. Hall, et al. previously established that such
perceptions of poll workers increased the confidence
and satisfaction that voters feel in the electoral process.
Building on their research, we have highlighted that
these perceptions of poll workers are actually customer
satisfaction measures of the new voting experience. Since
this experience is a new product, customer satisfaction
literature has suggested that atfect is a highly significant
determinant of initial customer satisfaction. Our analysis
of data from the 2006 Utah Colleges Exit Poll confirms
that affect has a large effect on the ratings voters assign
to their poll workers. According to our logistic regression
model. the impact of personally knowing at least one poll
worker at the precinct raises the predicted probability of
rating the poll workers as excellent by .10.
As Congress adjourns for the year, there has been
some discussion of modifying HAVA. Nevertheless. it
is unlikely that Utah will have to make drastic changes
to the electoral process in the coming years. Assuming
that the election process remains largely the same, the
dynamic model of customer satisfaction suggests that the
effect of atfect will decrease as voters become accustom
to the post-HAVA experience. We recommend that
social scientists continue to study the role of affect and
cognition in voter satisfaction. As the importance of affect
declines. we expect that voters will increasingly ground
their judgments of poll workers on cognitive evaluations.
In order for poll workers to maintain the high marks that
Hall. et al. say are important for high voter confidence
and satisfaction in the electoral process. poll workers
will have to exhibit higher competence. We recommend
that election officials recruit qualified poll workers, offer
thorough training, and provide incentives for poll workers
to volunteer in subsequent elections so that counties can
fill their precincts with qualified workers.
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Appendix 1
[B) Were you asked to present any identification before voting?
1. Yes, and the election official accepted my identification
2. Yes, but the election official rejected my identification
3. No, I was not asked to present any form of identification

[F) Did you ask for help using the touch screen voting system?
I. Yes, and I got help
2. Yes, but I did not get help
3. No, I did not ask for help
[H) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following

statements regarding your voting experience? Please circle one
number per line.
a. The instructions for using the voting machines were confusing
b. The touch screen voting machines were easy to use
c. It took too much time to vote
d. I felt like i voted in privacy

Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree

...

...

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

[PI Please rate the job performance of the poll workers at your
precinct today:
I. Excellent
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
[Q) Do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding the poll workers at your precinct? Please circle one
number per line.
a. The poll workers knew what they were doing
b. The poll workers were helpful
c. The poll workers treated me with respect
d. The poll workers knew how to operate the voting machines
rR) Did you personally know any of the poll workers at your
precinct today?
1. Yes
2. No
[V) What year were you born?

19

IWI Are you?
I. Male
2. Female

[XI Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n):
I. Strong Democrat
2. Not so strong Democrat
3. Independent leaning Democrat
4. Independent
5. Independent leaning Republican
6. Not so strong Republican
7. Strong Republican
8. Other
9. Don't know
[ZI What was the last year of school you completed?
I. Eighth grade or less
2. Some high school
8

Stroogly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree

...

...

2
2

3

4

5

3

4

5

2
2

3

4

5

3

4

5

ASHLEY ERICKSON, AMY LA MONICA, STEVEN A. SNELL, AND PATRICK SPENCER

3. High school graduate
4. Some college
5. College graduate
6. Post-graduate

[AAI What, if any, is your religious preference?
1. Protestant
2. Catholic
3. LOS / Mormon
4. Jewish
5. Other
6. No preference / No religious affiliation
7. Prefer not to say
[BBI How active do you consider yourself in the
practice of your religious preference?
1. Very active
2. Somewhat active
3. Not very active
4. Not active
5. Does not apply/Prefer not to say
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Appendix 2
Variable

Mean

Minimum

Maximum

Median

Std. Dev.

Mode

Rate the perfonnance of the poll workers
(I =excellent, O=less than excellent)

0.794

0

1

1

0.405

1

Personally knew a poll worker at the precinct
( I =yes, O=no)

0.446

0

1

0

0.497

0

0.473

0

I

0

0.499

0

0.208
0.004

0
0

1

I

0
0

0.406
0.063

0
0

Agree that instructions for voting machine were
confusing*

0.514

0

4

0

1.049

0

Agree that the voting machines were easy to
use*

3.454

0

4

4

1.158

4

0.422

0
0

4

0.964

4

0
4

0
4

I

1

5

3

Respondent's gender (I =male, O=female)
Whether voter asked for help
Asked for and received help
Asked for, but did not receive help

Agree that it took to much time to vote*
Agree that voted in privacy*
Index of poll worker judgments
Education level*
Religion
Active LDS
Non-active LDS
Active other religion
Non-active other religion
Partisanship
Republican
Independent

2.861
0.899
3.517

0
0

0.710
0.063
0.071

0
0
0

1

1

1
1

0.033

0

0.633
0.093

1.380
0.222
1.002

1

3

0
0

0.454
0.244
0.256

1
0
0

1

0

0.178

0

0

1

1

0.482

1

0

1

0

0.290

0

* Variable labels and response order are taken from the exit poll. but each value has been reduced by one so that the base of the variable is zero
instead of one.
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Appendix 3
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015
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Why Democracies Still Have Corruption:
AQuantitative Analysis Integrating Three
Theoretical Frameworks
Richard 1. Vigil

orruption corrodes democracy, decaying institutions
in every country regardless of regime type. When
politicians misuse public office for private gain, the
government loses legitimacy and accountability.' Corrupt public officials lead to inefficient and ineffective
government, causing citizens to distrust elected officials.
Democratic leaders come to power through elections, but
corruption sabotages electoral campaigns with illegal
money. Corruption undermines and erodes two central
nonns of democracy: equality and openness." Certain
individuals benefit at the expense of society, and "The
rights and protections citizens should be able to enjoy
become favors, to be repaid in kind."3 Most scholars now
accept that corruption poses a problem for many governments, and early studies have shown that corruption can
injure a state's opportunity for economic growth. 4 High
levels of corruption discourage foreign investment in a
country, reducing economic development. s Widespread
corruption also ties up funds that could otherwise be
available for economic growth. In addition, corruption
preserves and can even increase inequalities in the distribution of income."
States are now searching for answers to corruption.
In fact, "[m]otivated by a desire to help refonners curb
corruption, social scientists have tried for the last thirty
years to understand its causes and provide guides for its
control. "7 By examining the causes ofcorruption in today 's
governments, policymakers will be prepared to combat
and correct the problems that stem from corruption.
Revealing the causes for corruption will help countries
eliminate and prevent its effects. Understanding why
corruption occurs and why it occurs in some countries
more often than others will serve as the first step towards
legitimizing democracy.

C

Using a cross-national analysis, I identify the causes
of corruption in today's societies. Previous attempts at explaining corruption cross-nationally have only tested a few
theories and relied on a limited dataset, usually examining
corruption through one theoretical framework and testing their theories on fewer than one hundred countries. In
this study, I examine 142 countries to incrcase explanatory
power and make my findings more generalized. I also tested
how each comparative theoretical framework~rational
choice, cultural, and structural~affected corruption. Testing each approach allowed me to detennine which factors
matter the most in explaining and preventing corruption.
I will demonstrate that countries with a free press,
greater economic development, and high levels of Protestantism experience lower levels of corruption. In order
to demonstrate this, I first show that the level of democracy cannot by itself explain the variation in the levels
of corruption countries experience. Next, I examine different theories to look for potential explanations for corruption. Then, I operationalize the various variables and
test their strength in an OLS regression. Finally, I state
my findings and conclusions along with any implications
that the data provides.

AFailure of Democracy
Democracies claim to have many benefits in both
the political and economical realms. Many scholars have
argued that democracy prevents and mitigates the effects
and incidences of corruption. R In a study of the challenges
that corruption causes for democratic governance and
market economics, Wayne Sandholtz and William Koetzle
find that "those countries seen as least corrupt are those
nations that are known to be democratic" and "the countries
viewed as most corrupt are those traditionally seen as
13
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authoritarian."9 Furthennore, Mark Warren,lo studying
what corruption means in a democracy, concludes his
paper claiming that becoming more democratic will likely
cure the negative effects of corruption.
At first glance, corruption appears to correlate to the
regime type or the level of democracy. Using Freedom
House's Political Rights score as a measure of democracy
and Transparency International's Corruption Perception
Index (CPI), Figure 1 illustrates the negative relationship
between the level of democracy and the perception of
corruption. As the level of democracy improves, the perceived level of corruption diminishes and the less democratic states, or autocracies (score below four on democracy), suffer from more corruption. In fact, thirty-five out
of the thirty-eight autocratic countries scored below four
on the CPI, and Chad had the lowest score at I. 7. Only
Oman (6.3), Qatar (5.9), and Tunisia (4.9) scored above
a four. Conversely, the more democratic states enjoy less
corruption. Iceland has the highest score at 9.7 with the
other Scandinavian countries not far behind.
Figure 1: Democracy versus Corruption
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Political Rights

Three democratic principles can affect corruption:
participation, competition, and accountability. II A democratic regime allows everyone in society to participate in
the governing process by allowing all to pursue political
power and vote. Similarly, democracy promotes competition between candidates in legitimate elections that are
free, fair, and regular. Also, democracy promotes transparency and legitimacy to ensure that the public can hold officials accountable; ensuring, "Political rulers and elected
representatives serve as 'agents' of their constituencies
and must justify their actions and decisions in order to remain in office."12
14

Underneath these three broad principles, two key dimensions--elections and rights--explain how democratic
principles reduce and prevent corruption. 13 Elections increase accountability and allow voters to punish corrupt
officials. 14 As already mentioned, democracy ensures that
adult citizens have the right to vote and that politicians will
genuinely compete for office. Politicians must win by the
mandate of the popular vote. In principal, elected officials
derive their power from the public and are accountable to
their needs. 15 Elected officials cultivate trust from their constituents and other politicians by fulfilling campaign promises through honest and effective means; they avoid corruption to please the voters. Likewise, competitors for office
have an incentive to discover and publicize an incumbent's
corrupt behavior.16 Democratic elections also provide citizens the power to remove corrupt politicians more easily.17
Corrupt activities can impose large costs on society, and
the wallets of constituents. IX These costs will annoy voters,
and after repeated negative exposure, the public will punish
public officials. Once identified as corrupt, officials may be
removed from office, lose the next election, and face prosecution. The participatory processes of democracy encourage integrity in politicians and increase the costs of corruption. In contrast, authoritarian regimes have free reign unless restrained by democratic institutions, and authoritative
rulers face few checks on their power.
Finally, citizens in a democracy enjoy more rights that
are better protected. Democracies establish institutions such
as the judiciary and a police force to ensure the protection of
individual property rights. These institutions limit the ways
a public official may engage in corruption by increasing
transparency, and the likelihood of punishment. Effective
institutions protect the personal rights of individuals against
abuses from the state. Furthennore, democracy grants society basic freedoms: assembly, speech, press, etc. These
rights "allow people and groups to uncover infonnation, ask
questions, demand inquires, and publicize their discoveries."19 Media may freely investigate, witnesses may openly
testifY, and comlpt politicians will theoretically be caught.
But despite these prescribed remedies, corruption still
occurs in many democracies. Figure 1 reveals that comlption does not disappear and barely decreases as democracy
increases. In fact, Figure 1 shows a substantial range in the
frequency of perceived corruption, even among the most
democratic nations (score of seven for democracy). Arguably, these countries represent the strongest democracies
in the world and should enjoy the most from its benefits.
However, the levels of comlption range from 9.7 in Iceland to 3.4 in Poland, which has more corruption than some
authoritarian nations. Indeed, more than a third (34.15 percent) of the most democratic nations are below the median
level of perceived corruption. Authoritarian countries may
suffer the most from corruption, but high levels of corruption still exist in democratic regimes.

RICHARD

A bivariate regression reveals the weakness of this
perceived relationship. I checked for statistical and substantive significance using a test of correlation; the results
are displayed in Table 1. My results are highly statistically
significant, with a p-value of .000. However, the r-squared
reveals that the level of democracy in a state only explains
32.83 percent of its level of perceived corruption.
Table 1: Correlations between Democracy and Corruption

Corruption Pearson Correlation
Perception Sig. (2-tailed)
Index
N
Political
Rights

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

CORRlWITON
PERCEPTION
INDEX

POLmCAL
RIGHTS

142

.573(**)
.000
142

.573(**)
.000
142

142

** Correlation is significant at the 0.0 I level (2-tailcd).

What causes high levels of corruption to occur in
democratic regimes? How did some of the most democratic
countries almost eliminate corruption while others suffer
with high levels? I will attempt to answer these questions
in the following sections.

Explaining Corruption
Following the suggestion of Lichbach and Zuckerman, I will use three theoretical approaches to explain cornlption: rational choice, cultural, and structural."il Rational
choice theories look at the costs and benefits for an individual to use comlption based on the incentives within a
society. Cultural theories focus on the societal values and
norms that guide human behavior. And structural theories
examine how societal factors understood in a specific historical context combine to create or restrict opportunities
for corrupt behavior.

Rational Choice
Rational choice theories use an individual level of
analysis to focus on the behavior and actions of human
beings themselves. They assume that individuals make
rational decisions and seek to maximize self-interest."l
Individuals have preferences, and a rational agent always
chooses the preferred outcome over a less preferential
outcome. The rational choice framework claims that
when the gains from comlpt behavior outweigh the costs,
politicians will use corruption. On the other hand, when
the risk of exposure and possible punishments exceed the
anticipated benefits, public officials will not engage in
corrupt behavior.
The principal-agent theory represents one of the
leading theories used by rational choice theorists to explain corruption. Citizens, the principal, empower politicians. the agents, to achieve certain tasks for the public
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benefit. 22 However, in this delegation of power, agents
may abuse the relationship because of two problems:
hidden information and hidden action. 23 Citizens do not
have all of the information available to politicians, and
they cannot feasibly scrutinize the behavior of every
public official. Under these circumstances, agents have
the incentive and opportunity to engage in corrupt behavior and maximize their private gain. To remedy this
adverse relationship, society needs to make politicians
accountable to citizens and make politicians' actions
more transparent. 24 Monitoring provides one way to increase accountability and transparency.
Media plays a significant role in monitoring
politicians. 25 Newspapers, television news programs, and
radio news programs provide the public with a continuous
stream of information. Reporters and journalists search for
stories they think their audiences want to hear. Political
scandals and acts of corruption rank among their favorite
topics to report. A free and autonomous press may obtain
the resources necessary to inform the public about comlpt
behavior. On the other hand, if corrupt government
officials censor media, journalists are unable to publish
stories about comlpt behavior. Politicians in these
societies will engage in more corruption because their risk
of punishment is low. Thus, a country with a free press
should have lower levels of corruption.
Additionally, the population size may affect the incentives for corruption. 26 Countries with a large population
suffer from problems of coordination and collective action. So it is difficult for larger societies to monitor corrupt
officials. A bigger popUlation will usually require more
representatives, and, consequently, it will prove harder to
monitor an increased number of politicians. On the other
hand, smaller states, like Singapore, are easier to monitor.
Smaller populations usually have more etncient communication flow, and police have an easier time discovering
government fraud. Thus, a country with a smaller population should have lower levels of corruption.
Rational choice theory also considers economic
factors in determining the costs and benefits of corruption.
Scholars such as Max Weber argue that "economic
development was a necessary condition for the emergence
of rationally organized, legally driven bureaucracies
that exhibit little corruption."27 They believe that greater
economic development increases the rule of law and acts
as a control on corruption. With a strong nile of law, the
judicial and police systems may more effectively protect
and uphold property rights. When niles consistently govern
these rights, politicians have less incentive to engage in
corrupt acts.
Rational choice theory assumes that politicians, and
the public alike, desire more money. In poverty-stricken
areas, people may want to extend or receive a bribe. With
more material goods at stake, impoverished people have
15
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stronger incentives to engage in corrupt behavior. To
exacerbate the problem, under-funded agencies set up for
monitoring, such as police, will have a harder time ensuring
transparency and enforcing the law. Thus, a country with
more wealth should have lower levels of corruption.
On the other hand, the argument that wealth decreases corruption is an endogenous problem because
corruption may also decrease wealth. The violation of
property rights may prevent citizens from leaving impoverished conditions. Previous studies have already proven
the ill effects that corruption causes for the economy.28
Nevertheless, most scholars include a variable measuring
the effect of wealth when they try to explain corruption
cross-nationally. Such measurements may represent a theoretical oversight in explaining corruption, and further research may help explain the complex relationship between
the economy and corruption. However, in keeping with
previous scholars' works, I will measure the influence that
wealth has on corruption while keeping in mind that corruption may also affect wealth.
Finally, rationalists study the type of government.
Different democratic systems create different levels of
competition. A federal structure creates more competition
because of sub- jurisdictions. 29 Such decentralization of
federal states leads to more corruption because politicians
only have to influence small segments of the government,
and smaller actions are less visible. Fewer agencies exist
to oversee and enforce honesty. Similarly, public officials
may create stronger relationships with individuals in local
government arenas. Thus, a country with a non-federalist
structure should have lower levels of corruption.
In sum, under the rational choice theory, I will test
four hypotheses. First, countries with a free press will experience less corruption. Second, countries with smaller
populations will experience less corruption. Third, wealthier countries will experience less corruption. And fourth,
non-federal states will experience less corruption.

Culture
Cultural theorists argue that culture "shapes the behavior and actions of people, both at the individual and
collective levels."3o They understand culture "as an inherently fluid system of meaning, with multiple 'voices'
and a complex influence on social, political, or economic
processes."31 Cultural theories claim that countries have
high levels of corruption because their norms and values
permit it.
In general, cultural theorists blame a "culture of mistrust" for high levels of perceived corruption. 32 Where corruption has become commonplace, citizens begin to lose
trust in government officials. In a culture of mistrust, public officials may justify their corrupt actions by claiming
that everyone else is also corrupt. Corruption becomes "a
cultural legacy, building up over time and affecting the
16

politics of an entire region for generations."33 Religion
may affect the amount of corruption in a state. More hierarchical religions, such as Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy,
and Islam, provide fewer challenges and checks on the behavior of public officials. 34 Traditionally, these faiths teach
believers obedience to authority and blind faith. Politicians
develop an almost divine nature, and citizens will be less
likely to challenge their actions. On the other hand, Protestant faiths are more individualistic and provide fewer opportunities to engage in corrupt behavior. Thus, Protestant
countries should have less corruption.
Democratic norms may also explain the level of corruption. Democracy creates norms and values of equality
and participation that condemn corrupt behavior. These
values become engrained in society through a process of
socialization. Over time, this process strengthens as values diffuse and spread to broader parts of society. Some
scholars argue that a culture of democratic norms is a necessary step in eliminating corruption: "The public will not
care about detecting, publicizing, and punishing corrupt
acts unless broadly shared norms treat corruption as antagonistic to basic democratic values."35 A long history of
democracy should show deeply rooted norms and lower
levels of corruption.
In short, under the cultural theory, I will test two
hypotheses. First, predominantly Protestant countries will
experience less corruption. And second, countries with
deeper democratic roots will experience less corruption.

Structural
Many of the rational choice and cultural explanations
for corruption could overlap to create a system ripe for
corruption. A structural approach focuses less on the
individual causes and more on historically specific factors.
Structuralists believe that "human action and behavior are
fundamentally shaped by the larger environment, which,
in tum, is the product of dominant economic, political, and
social arrangements."36 These factors combine to create a
configuration that affects the level of corruption. 3 ?
Since I use a more generalized approach to explain
corruption, it is difficult to examine the unique institutional and structural factors of each country. Because the
structural approach relies more on modes and configurations, these variables will not be as reliable or valid in an
ordinary regression. Nevertheless, I will test one historically specific cause of corruption-colonialism. Recent
scholars argue that the varying colonial experiences created different "socioeconomic and cultural institutions
[in] postcolonial societies."3x More specifically, the economic, political, and sociocultural institutions that Britain set up in its colonies have caused the future countries
to develop differently than other colonies. Great Britain
primarily used a liberal model to establish colonies that
would maximize profit through exchange in free markets.
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This method promoted a common law system that upheld
private property rights, encouraged commercial production, and enforced the rule of law. Common law systems
help to reduce corruption by introducing powerful norms
that stress compliance with established procedures
and offer greater protection and recourse to individuals harmed by corruption. Contrastingly, other colonial
powers used more mercantilist methods that privileged
"status groups and explicitly imposer d] hierarchical relations of dependence." 39
In addition, the level of colonial involvement also
changed the historical outcomes of former British
colonies. 40 Great Britain colonized less complex areas
because they were easier to restructure. On the other
hand, other colonial powers left complex areas largely
unchanged because the existing institutions were so hard
to modify. Consequently, the postcolonial development
of former British colonies also depends on the level of
colonization, with heavier involvement leading towards
more development. Thus, under the structural theory I will
test one hypothesis: countries where Britain left strong
colonial legacies will experience less corruption.

Research Design
To test the explanatory power of these theories for
corruption, I operationalized the various variables and ran
a linear regression. The 142 countries I studied included
both democratic and authoritarian regimes, as well as high
variance in economic development. I compiled my data
for the year 2005.

Dependent Variable
I define corruption as the misuse of public office for
private gain. Scholars frequently use this definition, and it
is generally accepted in most mediums."l To operationalize
corruption, I used the 2005 CPI created by Transparency
Intemational. These scores range from 10 (least corrupt) to
o (most corrupt). Transparency International constructs its
index from nine to ten sources they had compiled during the
previous three years. They use three types of sources: country
experts, business leaders from developing countries, and
resident business leadersY By using a standardized measure
of comlption, I will more properly compare corruption
cross-nationally. Because Transparency International only
measures the perception of comlption, cultural differences
may skew the measure and make it difficult to test the true
influence of cultural values.

Independent Variables
I used several sources to compile data for my
independent variables. First, I created a control variable for
the level of democracy. I used Freedom House's Political
Rights score to operationalize democracy. Theoretically,
adding the Civil Liberties score to the Political Rights
one would create a more complete measure of democracy.
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However, Freedom House includes some of the other
variables I am testing in their measure of civil liberties.
Thus, I left the Civil Liberties measure out of my control
variable for democracy to avoid multicollinearity.
To measure political rights, Freedom House uses a
survey to determine the degree to which countries allow
people to participate freely in the political processY The
survey asks questions about three general areas-the electoral processes, political pluralism and participation, and
the functioning of government-as well as an additional
discretionary area. From the answers, Freedom House
compiles a measure that ranges from one (best) to seven
(worst). For the purposes of this study, I inverted the variable so that a seven represents more political rights, and a
one represents less.
To measure the effect of media on corruption, I used a
separate Freedom House survey that measures the freedom
of the press. It asks questions about the atfect on the media
in three general areas: the legal environment, the political
environment, and the economic environment. 44 This measure ranks press freedom from zero (best) to one hundred
(worst) and provides a value of the free flow of news and
information. Once again, for the purposes of this study, I
inverted this score so that one hundred represents the freest
press and zero represents the least.
I found two variables measuring the etfect of population size and wealth using the World Bank's World Development Indicators database. For population size, I entered
in the population value. To measure the impact of economic forces, I will use the measure for Gross Domestic Product (GOP) per capita measured in terms of Power
Purchasing Parity (PPP).
I used the 2006 CIA World Factbook to construct two
variables measuring the affect of federalism and Protestantism on corruption. I made federalism a dummy variable. Using the government type coding found in the
World Factbook, all those labeled as Federal and Federal
Republic received a one, and the remaining countries received a zero. For Protestantism, I recorded the percentage
of the population that is Protestant.
Using the Polity IV Project data, I constructed
a variable measuring the socialization of democratic
values. The polity research tradition codes "the authority
characteristics of states in the world system for purposes
of comparative, quantitative analysis."45 I used a sum of
Polity IV's polity two measure for every year that a country
scored a zero or more. The polity two score combines
the democracy and autocracy measures to provide a
quantitative measure for the strength of democracy. It uses
a scale ranging from negative ten (strongly autocratic) to
positive ten (strongly democratic). Because I only want
to test the positive effects that democratic values have on
corruption and not the negative effects that an authoritarian
regime might cause, I only added up the positive numbers
17
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in the polity two column and assigned a zero to countries
without any democratic experience.
To test for the effect of British colonial mle, I used a
measure constmcted by Matthew Lange, James Mahoney,
and Matthias vom Hau. 46 They created a five-point scale
measuring the different levels of colonialism in the former
British colonies. I assigned each label a corresponding
number ranging from zero (Low) to five (High).

Table 3: Factor Analysis
Variable

Factor
Loading

Press Freedom

.782

(ollinearity

Population

.036

Some of the variables I am using measure different
phenomena that may be correlated. Therefore, I ran a factor
analysis on all of the variables to test for multicollinearity;
Table 2 shows the results.

GDP (PPP) per capita

.813

Table 2: Factor Analysis
Variable

Factor
Loading

Political Rights

.814

Press Freedom

.876

Population

-.001

GDP (PPP) per capita

.800

Federal State

.302

Democratic Socialization

.872

Percent Protestant

.542

British Colonial Rule

.450

The results show that four variables-Political Rights,
Press Freedom, GDP (PPP) per capita, and Democratic
Socialization-loaded very heavily around 80 percent. Despite the statistical results, no one theory can justifY combining all four variables. Theoretically, I can only combine
the Political Rights and Democratic Socialization measures.
A transitioning democracy must begin to learn and teach
its citizens democratic norms and values, such as participation and accountability. Over time, these values spread
and increase in strength through a process of socialization.
As the democratic norms get stronger, democracy should
have more support and provide a more effective government. Thus, the political rights should also increase with
the socialization of democracy. Both factors seem to work
together to explain the strength of democracy in a given
country. Further, both variables measure similar aspects
of democracy. Democratic Socialization measures the
strength of the democratic norms and values in society,
and Political Rights measures the freedom to participate
in the political arena. However, the Democratic Socialization variable also measures the effectiveness of elections
and other procedural parts of democracy. Consequently, I
will constmct a single index, the Democratic Consolidation Index, out of these two variables. To constmct this
index, I scaled the two variables the same and calculated
their mean.
A second factor analysis (Table 3) reveals that the new
index variable corrected some of the correlation, but the
two remaining variables still loaded heavily in the analysis.
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Yet, I cannot theoretically combine Press Freedom or GDP
(PPP) per capita to any other variable. Thus, I will leave
all the variables as they are and keep the one Democratic
Consolidation Index.

Federal State

.360

Democratic Consolidation Index

.907

Percent Protestant

.593

British Colonial Rule

.525

Results
After operationalizing all the variables and correcting for multicollinearity, I set up my data to run an OLS
regression. In the regression, I checked for statistical and
substantive significance. I considered variables with a
p-value lower than .05 as statistically significant. Then
I looked for substantive significance by multiplying the
standard deviations of each variable by its coetIicient.
Table 4 shows the results of the regression.
Only three variables showed statistical significance:
Press Freedom, GDP (PPP) per capita, and Percent
Protestant. Press Freedom has a p-value of .019; GDP
(PPP) per capita has a .000 p-value; and the Percent
Protestant variable has a p-value of .023. All the other
variables showed no statistical significance.

Table 4: Regression
Variables

2005

Press Freedom

0.01 *
(.004)

Population

-2.849E-IO
(.00)

GDP (PPP) per capita

.00***
(00)

Federal State

-.253
(.26)

Democratic Consolidation Index

.001
(.001)

Percent Protestant
British Colonial Rule

.009*
(004)
.076
(07)

R
R2
N

.912
.832
142

*p<.IO; **p<.OI; ***p<.OOI.
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with standard
errors in parentheses
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To assess the substantive significance of each variable,
I multiplied the coefficient of each factor by its standard
deviation. Table 5 reveals the results. The same three
statistically significant variables also have the highest
substantive significance.

Once again, press freedom proved statistically significant, but the level of democratic consolidation also became
statistically significant. 80th variables have p-values of
.000. Also, the Percent Protestant variable lost its statistical
significance with a p-value of .318.

Table 5: Substantive Significance

Table 6: Regression without GOP (PPP) per capita

Variables

Substantive
Significance

Press Freedom

.24

Population

-.04

GDP (PPP) per capita

1.63

Federal State

-.08

Democratic Consolidation Index

.18

Percent Protestant

.20

British Colonial Rule

.10

Variables
Press Freedom
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2005
.028***
(-.006)

Population

-7.754E-IO
(.00)

Federal State

-0.263
(.403)

Democratic Consolidation Index

0.006***
(.001)

Percent Protestant

The Press Freedom variable shows a substantive
significance of .24. This means that for each standard
deviation in press freedom (24.33), the CPI increases by
.24. Transparency International uses a ten-point scale to
measure corruption and press freedom is measured on a
one hundred-point scale. Therefore, the media needs to
increase its freedom by almost a quarter to cause only a
2.4 percent decrease in corruption. Although this variable
proves statistically significant and has the second highest
substantive significance, a freer press does not dramatically
reduce the level of corruption.
The Percent Protestant variable shows a substantive
significance of .20. This means that for each standard
deviation in the percentage of the population that is
Protestant (22.42) the CPI increases by .20. This means
that 22.42 percent of the people of any given nation need
to convert to Protestantism in order to reduce corruption
by only 2 percent. Once again, the variable does not cause
a considerable change in the level of corruption.
GOP (PPP) per capita shows the greatest substantive
significance at 1.62. This means that for each standard
deviation of the variable (10,878) the CPI increases
by 1.62. Thus, an $11,000 increase in per capita wealth
reduces corruption by 16.2 percent. By far, GOP (PPP)
per capita causes the greatest change in the perception
of corruption. Therefore, I can conclude that wealth or
poverty contributes to the explanation of corruption the
most. As citizens begin to earn higher incomes, they
have less incentive to accept bribes, and, consequently,
politicians have less incentive to offer money for political
support. However, as previously mentioned, this finding
is problematic because corruption could be the cause
of poverty in many countries. Corruption may prevent
citizens from earning a better paycheck because all the
power and funds are concentrated among the elite. To
address endogeneity, I ran the regression again without
controlling for wealth. Table 6 shows the results.

I.

0.006
(006)

British Colonial Rule

-0.044
(.108)

R

.771

R2

.594

N

142

*p<.IO; **p<.OI; ***p<.OOI.
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with standard
errors in parentheses

To determine substantive significance, I again multiplied the coefficient by the standard deviation of each variable. Table 7 shows the results.
Table 7: Substantive Significance without GOP (PPP) per capita
Variables

Substantive
Significance

Press Freedom

.68

Population

-.11

Federal State

-.09

Democratic Consolidation Index

1.05

Percent Protestant

.13

British Colonial Rule

-.06

Both of the statistically significant variables also
showed the highest substantive significance. Press Freedom increased from .24 to .68. Without controlling for
wealth, a 25 percent increase in the media's freedom reduces corruption by 6.8 percent. This number still does
not reach the dramatic influence that wealth had on the
level of corruption, but excluding wealth makes the media's freedom cause almost a one step increase in the CPr.
Therefore, I can conclude that the level of press freedom
does partially explain corruption.
In addition, the level of democratic consolidation
dramatically increased its influence on corruption and
caused a substantive reduction in the CPI. The Democratic Consolidation Index shows a substantive signifi19
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cance of 1.05, so a one standard deviation increase in
the consolidation of democracy reduces cormption by
11 percent. Thus, as democratic values and norms become more engrained in society, the level of democracy
increases and corruption decreases.

Conclusion
Cormption represents a problem that every government must face. Although cormption affects every country,
some have managed to mitigate its effects. I have shown
that wealth, press freedom, and Protestantism correlate
with reduced cormption in governments. A democratic
culture may also reduce the occurrences of cormption.
On a broader theoretical level, these three factors
represent both the rational choice and cultural arguments.
Thus, it appears that determining the costs and benefits of
cormpt acts provides important insight about whether or
not a country will experience cormption. Likewise, certain
cultures seem more adept at controlling corruption than
others. These cultures promote honesty and pragmatism
and label cormption as a threat to democratic governance.
Although this study did not find any significant stmctural
argument, more work should be done to determine how
historical factors besides colonialism affect cormption.
This paper's generalized focus largely excluded many
possible stmctural factors.
In addition, my findings confirm and correct previous literature about corruption. In 2000, Sandholtz and
Koetzle concluded that wealth, strong democratic institutions, and the length of democracy affect corruption. I
have shown that wealth does indeed affect cormption,
but my results also correct their initial findings. A democracy can have strong institutions that promote political
rights but may still suffer from cormption. The level of
accepted democratic norms and values is more important at explaining cormption. In another cross-national
study, Daniel Treisman found that countries with Protestant traditions, histories of British mle, more developed
economies, and a non-federal stmcture experience less
corruption. 47 My results confirm Treisman's arguments
for Protestantism and economic development, but they
conflict with his conclusions that British colonialism and
federalism affect the level of corruption. Both of these
variables were neither statistically nor substantively significant in my study. And more recently, Xiaohui Xin and
Thomas Rudel identify poverty, large populations, and different political cultures as causes of cormption. 48 Once
again, my study confirms the idea that culture and wealth
affect the levels of corruption; however, I found that
large populations did not cause a significant change in
corruption. Despite these confirmations and corrections,
more work needs to be done to determine how economic
wealth and cormption relate to each other and affect the
other variables.
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Although press freedom, wealth, and religion are important factors, they mean little for honest policymakers
looking for quick fixes. Fighting cormption first requires
long-term efforts to increase the wealth of a nation. Economic development is a problem for many of the same
countries that are trying to eliminate high levels of corruption. Likewise, changing the religious beliefs of most
of a society is very difficult, especially in authoritarian regimes that deny freedom of religion. Thus, policymakers
must focus on different incentives for engaging in cormpt
acts. They need to grant the press freedom to monitor and
report on the actions of various government leaders. Also,
they should create protections for reporting the truth and
make necessary information public. Promoting the rule of
law by increasing the autonomy of the judiciary and the
efficiency of the police force will also help ensure the media's freedom. Making these reforms will begin the process necessary for other changes to occur that will help
control corruption.
NOTES
I. Anderson, Christopher J. and Yuliya V. Tverdova. "Corruption, Political
Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary
Democracies," American Journal (If Political SCience, 47, January
2003, pp. 91-109; Chang, Eric C. C. and Miriam A. Golden. Electoral
::':vstems, District Magnitude and Corruption, Departments of Political
Science at Michigan State University and the University of California
at Los Angeles, 2004; Griffith, Ivelaw and Trevor Munroe. "Drugs
and Democracy in the Caribbean," JOlll71al (If Commoml'ealth and
Comparative Politics, 33. November 1995, pp. 360-70: Moran, 1.
"Democratic Transitions and Fonns of Corruption," Crime, Lall'. and
Social Change, 36, December 200 I, pp. 3S5-95; Seligson, Mitchell.
"The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative
Study of Four Latin American Countries," Journal (If Politics, 64,
February 2002, pp. 408-33: Xin, Xiaohui and TIlomas K. Rudel. "The
Context for Political Corruption: A Cross-national Analysis," Social
Science Quarterly, 85, June 2004, pp. 294-309.
2. Della Porte, Donatella and Alessandro Pizzorno, 'The Business
Politicians: Reflections from a Study of Political Corruption," Journal
(If LaJl' and Society, Vol. 23, I, March 1996, pp. 73-94; Sandholtz,
Wayne and William Koetzle. "Accounting for Corruption: Economic
Structure, Democracy, and Trade," International Studies Quarter~l',
44, March 2000, pp. 31-50.
3. Warren, Mark E. "What Docs Corruption Mean in a Democracy?"
American Journal (If Political Science, 48, April 2004, pp. 328-43.
4. Doig, Alan and Stephanie Mcivor. "Corruption and its Control in
the Developmcntal Context: An Analysis and Selective Review
of the Literature." Third World QlIarter~v, 20, fall 1999, pp.
657-76: Knack, Stephen and Philip Keefer. "Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, 12, November 1995, pp.
207-27; Lambsdortl~ Johann. "Corruption in Empirical ResearchA Review," Unpublished manuscript, University of Goettingcn.
1999; Mauro, Paolo. "Corruption and Growth," Quarter~l' Journal
(If Economics. 110, August 1995, pp. 681-712.
5. Mauro.
6. Johnston, Michael. "Corruption, Inequality, and Change," Corrztption, Development, and Inequality: S(lfi TOllch or Hard Grqfi, cd.
Peter M. Ward, New York, Routledge, 1989.
7. Xin and Rudel, p. 295.
8. Drury, A. Cooper, Jonathan Krieckhaus, and Michael Lusztig.
"Corruption, Democracy, and Economic Growth," International
Political Science Reviell', 27, April 2006, pp. 121-136: Emcrson,

RICHARD

Patrick M. "Corruption, Competition and Democracy," Journal Qf
Development Economics, 81, October 2006, pp. 193-212; Golden,
Miriam A. and Eric C. C. Chang. "Competitive Comlption: Factional

9.
10.
II.

12.
13.
14.
15.

16.

17.

Conflict and Political Malfeasance in Postwar Italian Christian
Democracy," World Politics, 53, July 2001. pp. 588~622; Migdal,
Joel. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-society Relations and
State Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton, Princeton University
Press. 1988; Sandholtz and Koetzle; Xin and Rudel.
Sandholtz and Koetzle, p. 43.
Warren.
Smith. Alastair, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. Randolph Siverson and
James Morrow. The Logic Qf Political Sun!ival. Cambridge, MIT
Press. 2003.
Ibid.. p. 7.
Smith. 2005.
Sandholtz and Koetzlc.
Persson, Torsten, Guido Tabellini, and Francesco Trebbi. "Electoral
Rules and Corruption," Journal of European Economic Association.
I, June 2003, pp. 958-89.
Emerson; Treisman, Daniel. "The Causes of Corruption: A Crossnational StUdy." Journal of Public Economics, 76, June 2000, pp.
399-457.
Bueno de Mesquita, Brucc, James D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson,
and Alastair Smith. "Political Competition and Economic Growth."
Journal (If Democracy. 12. January 2001, pp. 58-72; North, Douglas.

Institutions. Institutional Change. and Economic
18.
19.
20.

21.

22.

23.

1.

VIGIL

42. Lambsdorff. The Methodologv of the ]005 Corruption Perceptions

Index, 2005.
43. Freedom House. "Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of
Political Rights and Civil Liberties," Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield,
Inc., 2006.
44. Freedom House. "Global Press Freedom Rankings," Lanham,
Rowman & Littlefield, Inc., 2006.
45. Marshall. Monty G. and Keith Jaggers. Polity IV Project: Dataset
Users'Manllal, Arlington, Polity IV Project, 2005.
46. Lange. et al.
47. Treisman.
48. Xin and Rudel.

REFERENCES
Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook, Springfield,
CIA,2006.
Corruptions Perception Index. Transparency International, 2005, http://
www.transparency. org/policy _ersearch/surveys_indiccs/cpi/2005
on 19 October 2006.
Dominguez, Jorge. "Latin America's Crisis of Representation," Foreign
Affairs, 76, January/February 1997, pp.10G-13.
Kaufmann, D., Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. Governance Matters

V Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicatorsfor 1996-]005,
Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2006.

Pe~formance.

Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1990.
Drury.
Sandholtz and Koetzle. p. 38.
Lichbach. Mark Irving and Alan S. Zuckerman. Comparati1'e
Politics: Rationality. Culture. and Structure, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press. 1997.
Lim, Timothy C. DOing Comparative Politics: An Introduction to
Approaches and Issues, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers,
Inc .. 2006.
Norlin, Kara Elizabeth. "Political Corruption: Theory and Evidence
from the Brazilian Experiencc," PhD dissertation, University of
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1997.
Kiewiet. D. Roderick and Matthew D. McCubbins. The Logic of

Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process,
Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Xin and Rudel.
Treisman.
Xin and Rudel.
Ibid .. p. 298.
Doig and Mcivor; Knack and Keefer; Lambsdorff. "Corruption in
Empirical Research·· ·A Review," 1999; Mauro.
29. Treisman.
30. Lim, p. 88.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

31. Ibid.
32. Xin and Rudel, p. 298.

33. Ibid.
34. Trcismun.
35. Sandholtz and Koetzle. p. 38.
36. Lim. p. 79.
37. Katznelson. Ira. "Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics"
in Lichbach, Mark I. and Zuckerman. Alan S .. eds. Comparatil'e
Politics: Rationality. Culture. and SInlcture. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press. 1997, pp. 97 123.
38. Lange. Matthew, James Mahoney. and Matthias vom Hau.
"Colonialism and Development: A Comparative Analysis of Spanish
and British Colonies," American Journal ()fSociology. III. March
2006. p. 1413.
39. Ibid.. p.1416.

40. Ibid.
41. Emerson; Golden and Chang 200 I; Sandholtz and Koctzle; Chang
and Golden 2004; Xin and Rudel.
21

Political Push Factors in Emigration:
AComparative Analysis
Rebecca Nielsen
or the last several decades the "brain drain" has
remained an unresolved issue in the field of political
development. Despite a large body of research
devoted to the topic, most work is theoretical rather than
observational. The few systematic studies of migration
have been limited to specific times and settings, and the
collective results do not fall into any generalized pattern.
This paper is intended to be a comparative study of "push
factors" to show why people migrate, and particularly
why people of different educational backgrounds migrate
at different rates. While many previous arguments about
migration assume that developing states are entirely at the
mercy of arbitrary and impersonal economic tides; I show
that governments might be able regulate migration, at least
partially, through political and social policies.

F

are the largest factor driving masses of educated people
to advanced industrialized states. While individuals with
professional training (in medicine, law, engineering, etc.)
may be in high demand in their native country, they can earn
far more competitive wages in a wealthier region. 4 Hence,
when the government of a less-developed nation invests in
educating its citizens, it is likely to suffcr a net loss; rather
than staying and contributing to society, graduates have
strong incentives to leave the country as soon as they secure
a degree or diploma, often without compensating for their
government-subsidized education. 5
The purpose of this paper is to build on existing studies by measuring brain drain effects using a large number
sample that allows for conclusions more broadly applicable
than those that could be reached with a case study.

Introduction
There is a general consensus that improved and
increased education is vital to achieving state development
and some scholars go further; Amartya Sen 1 argues that
education is a form of development because it affords
people greater choices and capabilities. Additional studies
suggest that accumulating human capital, such as a well
educated population, may lay the foundation for rapid
economic development." Frequently cited examples
include the Japan and Taiwan. 3 A large body of evidenceanecdotal or qualitative--on north-south relations indicates
that developing countries are falling victim to a brain
drain, their most brilliant minds are drawn off to more
prosperous and progressive nations in the developed
"north." This suggests that governments' efforts to educate
their citizens may prove futile. While there is a good deal
of disagreement over the precise causes of the brain drain,
most scholars concur that asymmetric economic incentives

The Brain Drain in literature
The largest body of literature on brain drain portrays
it as a dire setback in Third- World development that can
only be solved with tremendous cooperation and effort on
the parts of both north and south. Dependency theorists
argue that by setting high educational requirements for
immigrants, governments with developed economies
exacerbate the drain on the developing world by
filtering out the undereducated and welcoming trained
professionals; thus, realizing a "brain gain" at the
expense of the source nation.I' Some go so far as to claim
that developed countries are deliberately exploiting
developing countries by "skimming off' the most skilled
and intelligent foreign laborers.7 The ideal solution, these
scholars contend, is for developed nations to reform
their immoral apathy toward Third World troubles and to
adequately compensate source countries for each skilled
worker they lose. H
23
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However, since the first articulation of the brain drain
effect in the mid-twentieth century, the urgent sense that the
drain must be "plugged" has diminished in the academic
community; in fact, many development scholars have begun
to view a brain drain as potentially beneficial for source
states in the developing world. Proponents of the "diaspora
theory" believe that migration to the north has the potential
to secure net monetary gains for the developing source
states through direct remittances and donations as well as
by opening new channels for the flow of information. 9 ill
advanced countries, economies of scale and the availability
of superior technology allow educated migrants to be more
effective and productive than they could possibly be in their
native region. 11l In their improved economic circumstances,
migrants can better aid those left behind by sending back
remittances, offering expert advice, and helping to start
businesses, as Kwabena O. Akurang-Parryll demonstrates
in a case study of Ghanian expatriates. Andrew Mountford I 2
calculates that an alleged brain drain may, under the right
conditions, actually lead to a rise in educational attainment
in the source country. He argues that if people perceive high
economic returns on emigration, and educated people are
most capable of migrating, then more people will enroll
in school. In the I 960s, Turkey and Jordan followed a
minimally successful "3 R" agenda based on diaspora
theory: recruitment of citizens to migrate abroad, collection
of remittances, and eventually the return of these workers,
with skills added. 13 While several recent case studies
have affirmed that remittances do increase educational
attainment in the source country,14 David McKenzie and
Hillel Rappoportl5 show that Mexican children are less
educated in families with migrant members.
If the pull of wealthier nations is the only significant
factor behind migration and the most pessimistic brain
drain theorists are right, then the outlook for developing
countries is bleak. Migration forms a vicious circle: citizens leave because the country is relatively poor, thereby
depriving it of human capital, a shortage which in tum
impedes even the best development efforts by the government. Without development, the state remains poor.
If states try to limit emigration by force, they will encounter not only logistical but ethical dilemmas: emigration (though not necessarily immigration) is commonly
considered a human right; the ability of people to "vote
with their feet."16 Advanced industrialized countries, on
the other hand, seek to exercise strict control over immigration by using educational standards to regulate legal
migration so that only the most qualified applicants may
enter. Such limited migration represents a beneficial gain
of skilled workers for whom the host country is spared the
costs of training; thus, these countries have little incentive
to change the status quo. This situation seems inevitable
unless there are other, more dynamic elements that can
mitigate a brain drain-that is, factors that the source gov24

ernment can adjust or alter to some degree. If such factors
exist, then perhaps developing states can control the extent of their migration without depending on unlikely and
unreliable cooperation of others.
Brain drain case studies often examine "push and
pull factors" to determine the motives of individuals that
migrate between nations. Pull factors are characteristics
of the host country that attract immigrants; for example,
a strong, stable economy, high wages or job availability.
Conversely,pushfactors are features of the source country
that explain why inhabitants would seek to emigrate,
including low-average income, war, or high rates of
disease. This paper assumes that in general all developing
countries face similar pull factors from the world at large;
thus, its focus is primarily on push factors and the degree
to which they determine the likelihood of migration.
While economic disparities might be the most significant push factors behind migration for all education
levels, data collected by Frederic Docquier and Abdeslam
Marfouk l7 show that variously educated groups migrate
at rates that differ significantly not only from each other
but from the overall migration rates in each country. As
brain drain theorists predict, people appear most likely to
migrate with at least a secondary education. The highly
educated tertiary groups are theoretically the most capable
of moving-and often gain the most from it monetarily.
The available data generally supports this fact, although
in several cases migration rates among the population with
only secondary school attainment outstrips that of both
the most and least educated sectors. For example, in Laos
in 2000, the migration rate among residents with tertiary
educations was 13.8 percent; among those with secondary educations this figure rose to 20.9 percent, while the
overall migration rate was a mere 7.1 percent. There is
also significant variation in the overall rates from country
to country, ranging from 44 percent in Tonga to virtually
none in Lesotho.
Why do these rates fluctuate from country to country,
and from group to group? I conclude that there are factors
in addition to education level and economic incentives
that dictate these irregularities in migration. Certain of
these factors must have a larger impact for one particular
educational group than for the others, and the total
distribution of these factors in a country should explain
higher or lower emigration rates relative to other nations:
hence, the comparative nature of this study. If there are
indeed other factors governing migration apart from pure
economic gain, then perhaps governments may indirectly
regulate emigration by adjusting those factors as they see
fit. Procedures to reduce emigration could be implemented
when soaring rates are harming the source country; reverse
policies (intended to encourage migration) could possibly
alleviate unemployment pressures or promote the creation
of a beneficial diaspora.
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Theory and Hypotheses
In line with the bulk of brain drain theorists, I
expect that overall economic indicators will have the
largest influence on each sector of the population.
Representative of many economic arguments is that of
Harry Johnson,ls who explains migration as the result
of rational cost-benefit analyses by individuals. Trained
professionals naturally flow to the areas where they are
in most demand-that is, where people will pay the most
for their services. If a skilled laborer calculates that he
or she will make much more per year after migration
and that migration outweighs the expenses of travel and
resettlement, then they will go abroad. I hypothesize that
nations with lower, average incomes will tend to generate
more migration to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)19 countries at a fairly
constant rate across educational groups. While educated
people are likely to receive relatively higher wages even
in a low-income country (and are therefore more capable
of a costly undertaking like migration) educated people
also tend to create positive externalities in developing
countries. As Johnson 20 notes, people often appreciate
the positive externalities they provide and will factor that
loss into the mental calculus of any migration decision,
resulting in a tempering of migration among educated
groups. Therefore, I hypothesize the following:
1. Increased incomes reduce incentives fa emigratejor all
education groups.
One of the more controversial theoretical debates in
migration studies concerns the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and cross-border migration.
In the context ofthe Heckscher-Ohlin model, FDI appears
to strike at the root causes of migration by creating businesses, increasing employment and reducing the inequality between domestic and foreign wage rates. The United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development asserted
in 1996 that FDI
contributes directly to a reduction of migration through
job creation in foreign affiliates and ... contributes to
economic development by bringing technology and
organizational and managerial know-how and providing origin countries access to markets. FDI can thus
generate a sense of hope among potential migrants for
a better economic future in countries with insufficient
capital but abundant labour. 21
A study by Patricio Aroca and W.F. Mal oney22 affirmed
that FDI flows into Mexico from the U.S. had dampened
illegal migration. However, at the same time that FDI
alleviates outward pressure, it lifts constraints (such as
extreme poverty) that may have previously impeded
movement. Moreover, FDI generates opportunities for
migration by strengthening ties and business networking
between the north and developing countries and, in this

sense, FDI may be a complement, rather than a substitute,
for migration. To illustrate one instance of this, Phillip
Martin 23 cites the example of export processing zones
(EPZs) on state borders where FDI is often concentrated,
such as the maquiladoras along the Mexican-U.S. border.
These factories attract thousands of workers, and the
surplus tends to trickle over illegally into the U.S.

2. Foreign direct investment influences decisions to migrate but it is unclear whether this impact will be positive
or negative.
In addition to the economic situation, I posit that
the political environment of a country has a measurable
effect on migration, and that political dissatisfaction
will promote migration. A study of migration from
Bangladesh to India attributes the movement partly to
"political instability, fear of riots and terrorism," as well
as an "absence of democratic rights" in Bangladesh
which was driving ethnic strife between Muslims and
Hindus. 24 According to Pranati Datta the economic
depression in Bangladesh was the most decisive factor
in emigration but 65 percent of respondents claimed that
bad governance was one of the contributing issues. I
anticipate that the impact of political liberties and civil
rights (or the lack thereof) will be greater among the more
highly educated strata. University graduates, especially
those who study abroad in developed countries, will be
much more sensitive to the performance shortfalls of
their own governments and likely to become fmstrated
if a government suppresses discussion or ignores their
input. Educated people are also more predisposed to
engage in activities that governments will dislike or
interfere with, such as arranging demonstrations, writing
provocative articles, starting up businesses, or mnning
unofficial civil associations.
Given this trend, autocratic regimes are inclined to
distmst the more educated echelons of society because
they recognize that these people are influential and when
dissatisfied the educated strata may orchestrate subversive
activities. Thus, the intellectual elite will be a particular
target for violence and repression, as in the "Great Purge"
under Stalin or Saddam Hussein's Iraq, where purportedly
more than five hundred journalists were murdered by
the government. 25 Furthermore, in the face of political
uncertainty or current, bad policies with the potential lead
to revolt, repression, or violence in the future, educated
workers with relatively high incomes are most able of
removing themselves and their families from the region
before these events occur. However, the relationship
between political freedom and migration may function
on a curve: while I predict that the most liberal societies
will be fairly static, totalitarian mlers like Kim Jong II of
North Korea may try to isolate the country by imposing
interdictions on migration to keep citizens from fleeing
oppression or recmiting help from the outside world; thus,
25
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the absence of migration is not necessarily indicative of a
political paradise.
4. Governments that are unresponsive or deny civil and political freedoms to citi=ens will see increased emigration,
especially among the secondary and tertiary education
groups, except in extreme cases where an authoritarian
government locks the borders.
In a similar vein, high levels of violence or breakdowns in the rule of law should fuel migration rates
across all groups as the educated and non-educated alike
flee to escape. Educated people, on average the wealthiest, may be in the best position to put distance between
them and the violence, but civil unrest tends to target the
rich and educated first. In civil wars, enemies try to remove each other's assets, including human capital such
as professional doctors, politicians, and business owners.
In post-invasion Iraq, where universities are plagued by
looting and terrorist attacks, over two hundred professors have been killed since 2004. 26 In sudden outbursts
of hostility, many educated people may not have time to
flee the country before being stripped of their property
or killed.
5. Violence and the threat of physical harm will induce
migration across all educational levels.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM)27
devotes an entire chapter of a recent publication on world
migration to the issue of AIDS. The HIVIAIDS illness is
particularly prevalent in developing countries where it
kills off workers in their prime, resulting in orphaned dependents and workforces too young, small, and inexperienced to fill labor demands. IfMartin 2R is right in claiming
that scarcity of jobs is a push factor in migration, then the
spread ofHlV/AIDS ought to reduce migration. However,
AIDS might contribute to migration as infected individuals seek advanced treatment in developing countries; the
10M believes it might, noting that death rates for adults
with HIV are about twenty times higher for lower-income
countries than industrialized states.
In countries where the risk of disease is very high and
medical resources are limited, educated people will move
to keep themselves and their children from becoming
victims. If a person is already infected but cannot access
the necessary treatments in their home country, they will
try to move to an advanced country where their sickness
can be dealt with. Less educated people are not as likely as
others to move based on health needs. They may not realize
that they are sick or that their illnesses can be treated, and
even if they do they are more likely than educated people
to seek folk remedies or blame the disease on superstitious
causes like witchcraft. If they are poor or live in isolated
rural areas they will often accept death and disease as part
of life because they cannot afford to migrate and then pay
for treatment.
26

6. High levels ofdisease and low access to healthcare will
increase migrationfor the tertiary education group.
Finally, I hypothesize that a certain social "herd
behavior" is evident in migration patterns. When Kez
Miyagiwa29 discusses how economies of scale work
into the brain drain he is primarily interested with the
professional effectiveness of educated workers in various
more or less advanced environments. However, Miyagiwa
also suggests that educated people enjoy the company of
their peers; they like to be able to discuss and share ideas
and collaborate with equals. Ifpeople feel they have others
with similar interests with which to associate and form
friendships or mutually beneficial relationships, they will
be less inclined to leave for a foreign country where they
do not know anybody. On the other hand, if there is not a
solid base of academic institutions and networks (research
groups or scholarly magazines, for instance) or at least a
critical mass of educated people remaining in a country,
then the educated population will continue to leave.
By extension, if educational opportunities in a
developing country are very low, students hoping to
advance their education will not be satisfied to stay
put-many will go abroad to finish their education, and
while abroad they are likely to form personal connections
that bind them more to the host country than their native
home. Anthony Barclay,") in an overview of the brain
drain with regards to the University of Liberia, argues
that many emigrants leave, not so much out of a desire to
maximize profits, but out of a desire to learn. Third World
universities are crowded, under-equipped, poorly staffed,
and targeted by repressive regimes; students realize that
for an effective education they need to study abroad. Once
they establish themselves overseas they find that they are
better respected or that their skills are more effective in
their adopted country. Thus the drain perpetuates itself
because the professionals left behind to teach the next
generation have mediocre training and lack access to new
ideas and methods. In order for levels of social capital to
be maintained in the home country, the government must
provide adequate educational resources. Lindsay LowelP!
proposes policies to help governments retain university
students, such as offering scholarships conditional
upon staying in the country, allowing larger budgets for
schooling, and exonerating loans for graduates who enter
the national workforce.
7. A higher concentration of educated people will tend to
decrease emigrationfor the tertiary and secondary education groups.
8. Government investment in education should serve to
reduce migration abroad.

Data

Dependent Variable: Emigration Rates
Empirical studies of the brain drain, its causes and its
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effects, have been lacking due to a deficit of data about
migration worldwide. While countries tend to regulate
immigrants as they enter the country, many-with the
exception of the most repressive or totalitarian regimes,
like North Korea and China-are relatively less concerned
about monitoring who leaves. Migrants are often subject
to quotas and required to meet educational requirements
or various other criteria upon entering a new country, but
many host nations (particularly those outside of the OECD)
do not compile comprehensive records of the country of
origin, age, skill level, or profession of those who are
approved for admission. Moreover, some migrants may
bypass legal processes by slipping through unpatrolled
borders. The OECD itself makes an etfort to track
and publish data about immigration stocks in member
countries, but these data are not specifically broken down
by both the source country and educational attainment
and are, therefore, inadequate to calculate emigration
stocks with regard to educational qualifications.
Without statistics for emigration rates, the purported
brain drain from developing countries is virtually impossible to quantitY. In one of the first and few attempts to
do so on a large scale, William J. Carrington and Enrica
Detragiache 32 compiled somewhat flawed estimates that
merely identified which regions were experiencing the
greatest "drain." They derived their statistical model for
the brain drain by determining the skill structure for each
country of origin among U.S. immigrants and then projecting those proportions on the entire OECD migrant stock.
However, this method fails to control for a number of factors, not the least of which is the inconsistent skill makeup
of immigrant profiles across OECD countries. So far, little
quantitative, non-theoretical research has tested for effective political strategies to control the drain or for the direct
effects of migration on development, with the exception of
Michel Beine et al. 33 who used Carrington and Detragiache's estimates to predict the consequences of the brain
drain for economic growth. A working paper by Richard
H. Adams 34 also uses methods similar to Carrington and
Detragiache to determine the effects of remittances on
labor-exporting countries.
The estimates provided by Docquier and Marfouk35 improve on the Carrington and Detragiache model in a number
of ways, although the work is preliminary. Docquier and
Marfouk use census information from twenty-five OECD
countries (covering 92 percent of OECD migrant stocks)
and account for the educational attainment of migrants
for each country individually. From this they calculate the
yearly rates of emigration trom 190 countries (for 1990 and
2000). It is important to note that in this study, emigration
rate refers to the percentage of a given country's native labor force that is living outside of the country, not necessarily the percentage that leaves in that year. Docquier and
Marfouk determine the overall emigration rates and the

rates for three skillleducationallevels: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary refers to those with zero to
eight"years of schooling, secondary to those with nine
to twelve years, and tertiary to those with thirteen or
more. The three rates are referred to in my regressions respectively as Primary Emigration, Secondary Emigration,
and Tertiary Emigration. I also test my independent variables against the total emigration rates for each country.
While the Docquier-Marfouk model is the most recent
and accurate model of world emigration, it has several
drawbacks that may distort or obscure the outcome of my
tests. First, for OECD states where information on the age or
educational structure of migrants was lacking, Docquier and
Marfouk were forced to extrapolate from the composition
of migrant populations in other OECD countries. Since
educational attainment statistics are generally unavailable
for illegal migrants, they assume that most illegal migrants
fall into one of the lesser educated groups.
Second, the emigration database includes only migrants over age twenty-five (in order to facilitate crossanalysis with the Barro-Lee education database) but does
not account for the age and educational level at which immigrants entered the country, or how long they have lived
there. This makes it impossible to differentiate between
migrants who were educated before, as opposed to after
they were "drained," which is an important distinction for
many brain drain analysts. George J. Sefa Dei and Alireza
Azgharzadeh show that the brain drain can happen in two
nonsequential "phases:" in the first phase, individuals migrate after receiving an education in their native country;
in the second, individuals travel abroad to receive education and then fail to return. The former phase is implicitly
more damaging to a developing country because education is expensive and often highly subsidized within the
source state. 36 The Docquier-Marfouk database will give
an identical classification to an individual who migrated
as an infant and spends their entire educational experience
in an OECD country as to someone who migrates as a
twenty-eight-year-old medical doctor. Likewise, as the authors point out, there is also no way to control for graduate
students who are studying abroad temporarily, although
the twenty-five-year-old cut off will filter out many of
these cases.
Third, this data only captures migration from
developed or developing nations to OECD nations, which
encompasses roughly about 60 percent of total world
migration. The other 40 percent usually occurs as citizens of
developing nations move to relatively progressive nations
that still fall in the Third World category; South Africa,
Singapore, and the Gulf States are popular destinations.
Moreover, migrants from the poorest countries may not
be able to move far to escape interstate violence and
civil wars-if Docquier and Marfouk were to compile
similar data for 2006 they would not capture the massive
27
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inflows of Iraqi refugees to neighboring Syria and Jordan.
However, Docquier and Marfouk are confident that their
data captures at least 85 percent of the world's most
educated migrants; thus, the tertiary estimates may be the
most precise reflection of actual migration decisions.
Independent Variables
To measure income I use gross national income
(GNI) per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP) in current international dollars, as obtained from the year 2000
World Development Indicators provided by the World
Bank. 37 This figure is the sum of all goods and services
produced in the country in a given year, divided by the
population and adjusted for the actual purchasing power
of that amount. Because GNI tends to have a logilinear
form I used the log of GNI in my regressions. Unfortunately, while GNI per capita may represent an average
income, it does not account for the distribution or spread
of income-in other words, the income gap. This may be
particularly pronounced in states were the government or
concentrated group owns a natural rent (like oil or beachside real estate) that does not directly profit the people at
large. However, including measures of inequality, such as,
the Gini coefficient, would severely limit my sample size.
So, using GNI by itself is practical compromise.
Figures for inward FDI flows in 2000 are available
from the United Nations Foreign Direct Investment
Database 38 and are quantified in U.S. dollars at current
prices in millions. Martin 39 warns that FDI may take years
to affect migration behaviors, but here I assume that FDI in
the year 2000 will be somewhat indicative of the amount
ofFDI in previous years.
To measure the quality of governance and political
liberty I used the Polity 2 variable from the Polity IV
Project database produced by the Center for International
Development and Conflict Management. 40 This variable
ranges from negative ten (strongly autocratic) to positive
ten (strongly democratic) and represents the difference
between the democracy and autocracy scores assigned to
each state by the Polity IV Project. These scores are coded
based on the presence of electoral institutions, the degree
of political competition and participation, constraints on
the executive, and so on. In my regressions this variable is
simply named Polity. To control for cases where autocratic
governments unduly restrict emigration, I use the freedom
of movement dummy variable from the CingranelliRichards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. 41 A value of zero
for the Movement variable represents a government that in
some way restricts the movement of its citizens.
Likewise, I gauge levels of violence using the CIRI
index for physical integrity which encompasses measures
of extra-judicial killings, disappearances, political imprisonment, and torture. This scale ranges from zero to nine
with higher values indicating less frequent incidents of
violence and greater respect for physical integrity.
28

Data on the spread of HIV has relatively good
coverage in comparison with most other health indicators,
which makes it advantageous over other possibilities for
operationalizing health. I obtained the prevalence of HIV
from the 2000 World Bank Development Indicators where
it is expressed as the infection rate for people ages fifteen
to forty-nine as a percent of total population.
I use government spending on education as a rough
measure of the educational opportunities in a country and
of the relative quality of that education. I assume that higher
government expenditures on a particular level of education
correlates either with the provision of educational programs,
faculty, textbooks, and scholarships to a wider sector of the
population, or with the attainment of better educational
standards by those that are educated. The variable Education Spending does not represent gross spending but rather
the percentage of total government spending allocated to
education as reported by the United Nations Human Development Report.42
Social capital is difficult to quantify and consequently the methods I use to account for it are imprecise.
The variable Youth Bulge is based on a scale created by
the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy43 which converts the popUlation age zero to fourteen as a percent of
the total population into a nine-point scale, where one
signifies a low growth rate and nine signifies a high
growth rate. This captures demographic stress-population pressures which may increase emigration, especially
as laborers move to support their families and ensure better education for their children. I use this variable cautiously due to its fairly high correlation with a number of
other control variables, such as, GNI Log, Polity, HIV,
and Physical Integrity (see Appendix, Table 6). Second,
I use the various migration rates as determinants of each
other: this serves as an imperfect measure of the educational composition of each state and the "herd behavior"
that I expect to see in migration patterns. In using this
approach, I must acknowledge the possibility that any
relationship between the emigration rates could be spurious; in other words, third party variables might cause the
change in both the dependent and independent emigration
rates. The correlation between Tertiary Emigration and
Secondary Emigration, as well as that between Secondary
Emigration and Primary is high. However, the correlation
between Tertiary Emigration and Primary Emigration is
comparatively low at 0.28 (see Appendix, Table 6).

Methods
I test all of my independent variables against my four
dependent variables using an Ordinary Least Squares (0 LS)
regression for a sample of 105 countries. A regression
will demonstrate what extent my variables explain the
migration rate and reveal which independent variables are
most important in determining each dependent variable.
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Results
I first tested all of my determinants against the total
emigration rates for each country (see Table 1). Model 1
confirms that a GNI per capita is negatively correlated with
migration. Contrary to my predictions, however, emigration
actually appears to increase with polity scores and decrease
with the prevalence of HIV, though only slightly in
either case (for instance, a 5 percent difference in HIV
corresponds with only a I percent change in emigration,
given the first model). Model 2 demonstrates that in the
absence of a variable to control for the youth bulge GNI
loses significance; potential migrants with the same income
may make different decisions based on the varying rate of
population growth. This second regression also suggests
that lower levels of violence facilitate emigration.
Table 2 shows the effect of these same variables on
the rate of emigration among people with the lowest levels
of education. It is interesting to note that a youth bulge
seems associated with diminished rates of emigration;
thus. as a population increases more quickly, people in
this group migrate slightly less. This may be a result of
a higher dependency ratio which cuts deeply into the
salaries ofthose less-skilled workers who might otherwise
be eager and able to migrate. In the second model, FDI
has a negative, but substantially inconsequential effect on
emigration; the most significant determinants are Physical
Integrity, HIV. and Polity. Once again, the results contradict
my prediction that improvements in democracy and the
rule of law will alleviate outward migration pressures and
HIV continues to be associated with attenuation in the
emigration rate.
For potential migrants with secondary educations
my hypothesized variables have little explanatory power.
although Polity, HIV. and GNI Log maintain significance
(see Table 3). Education spending appears to reduce
emigration, but not to a large degree. As a government
increases the percentage of its total budget spent on education from 20 percent to 25 percent, this will depress
emigration for the secondary group by about 0.4 percentage points.
For emigrants with a tertiary education (see Table 4),
GNI per capita and HIV are the single largest determinants
of emigration; a comparison with Model I in Table 2 will
show that GNI is much more important for tertiary level
emigration than for the primary level. As in the previous
tests, higher GNI is associated with lower rates of
emigration, but migration is also dampened by HIV, such
that if HIV prevalence rose from 5 percent to 10 percent in
a population, we would expect nearly a 3 percent decrease
in emigrants. The dampening effect of HIV on migration
is slightly more for the tertiary education level than the
primary or secondary levels.
Rates for emigrants with tertiary educations can be
better explained with the introduction of the other migration

Table 1. Regression of Hypothesized Determinants on Total
Emigration Rates
Modell:
TOTAL
EMIGRATION

Model 2:
(YOUTH BULGE
excluded)

-0.727**
(0.35)

-0.506
(0.31)

-0.00000459
(0.0000061)

-0.00000708
(0.0000060)

0.206***
(0.068)

0.236***
(0.064)

MOVEMENT

-0.485
(0.74)

-0.578
(0.72)

PHYSICAL INTEGRITY

0.293
(0.22)

0.435**
(0.19)

-0.216***
(0.059)

-0.255***
(0.052)

Variable
GNILOG
FDIINFLOW
POLITY

HIV
YOUTH BULGE

-0.287
(0.21)

EDUCATION SPENDING

-0.035
(0.021)

-0.038*
(0.D21)

Constant

22.45**
(9.55)

15.03*
(7.96)

105
0.24

\05
0.23

Observations
R-squared

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.Ol, ** p<o.05, * p<o.l

Table 2. De endent Variable: Emi ration Rates for Primar Education

Variable
GNILOG
FDIINFLOW
POLITY

Modell:
PRIMARY
EMIGRATION

Model 2:
(YOUTH BULGE
excluded)

-0.446*
(0.25)

-0.079
(0.21)

-0.00000758
(0.0000048)

-0.0000117**
(0.0000048)

0.134**
(0.059)

0.185***
(0.056)

-0.969
(0.86)

(0.83)

0.297*
(0.17)

0.533***
(0.16)

HIV

-0.107***
(0.036)

-0.173***
(0.037)

YOUTH BULGE

-0.478***
(0.16)

MOVEMENT
PHYSICAL INTEGRITY

-1.13

EDUCATION SPENDING

-0.012
(0.020)

-0.017***
(0.020)

COllstallt

15.31**
(7.13)

2.94
(5.30)

105
0.32

105
0.27

Observations
R-squared

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.Ol, ** p<O.05, * p<O.l
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Table 3. Dependent Variable: Emigration Rates for
Secondary Education
Modell:
SECONDARY
EMIGRATION

Model 2:
(YOUTH BULGE
excluded)

-0.700
(0.43)

-1.161**
(0.46)

-0.00000883
(0.0000075)

-0.00000362
(0.0000071 )

0.310***
(0.11)

0.246**
(0.10)

MOVEMENT

0.554
(1.25)

0.751
( 1.40)

PHYSICAL INTEGRITY

0.336
(0.33)

0.0395
(0.29)

-0.427***
(0.13)

-0.345***
(0.087)

Variable
GNILOG
FDIINFLOW
POLITY

HIV

YOUTH BULGE

0.601
(0.41)

EDUCATION SPENDING
COllstallt

Observations
R-squared

-0.0769**
(0.038)

-0.0704*
(0.036)

IS.44
(12.0)

34.00***
(12.1)

105
0.13

105
0.12

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<O.Ol, ** p<o.05, * p<O.l

rates as determinants. In Table 4, these rates are significant
while HIV and GNI per capita remain good predictors of
emigration. As mentioned earlier, the reliability of Model I
in Table 4 is dubious because of the high correlation between
the secondary and tertiary emigration rates. Oddly enough
in Model 2, the emigration rate for the lowest education
group seems to do a better job at predicting the tertiary rate
by itself. My social capital hypothesis held that decisions to
migrate would be most influenced by the actions of those
with the same or similar education but this regression gives
the impression that well educated workers take their cue to
migrate from the least educated members of their society.
In Model 2, controlling for the other factors, an increase of
five in the primary emigration stock corresponds with an
increase of 6.6 in the tertiary emigration stock!4 Perhaps.
if a government can decrease emigration among citizens
with primary educations, they will also reduce emigration
among those of higher education. In Model 4, FDI inflows
become significant but where the efiect was negative for
Primary Education, here the value is positive. Although FDI
is not substantively significant, this does reflect the idea that
FDI plays a dual role in both facilitating and substituting
for emigration. Similarly, where an increase in the Physical
Integrity Index correlated positively with overall and
primary level emigration, here it appears to do the opposite:
a three-point improvement cuts tertiary level emigration by
almost three percentage points.

Table 4. Dependent Variable: Emigration Rates for Tertiary Education
Modell:
TERTIARY
EMIGRATION

Model 2:
(YOUTH BULGE
excluded)

GNILOG

-3.185***
(1.20)

-3.576***
(0.99)

FDIINFLOW

0.0000238
(0.000022)

0.0000282
(0.000019)

POLITY

0.201
(0.35)

0.146
(0.33)

MOVEMENT

2.59
(4.26)

2.76
(4.27)

PHYSICAL INTEGRITY

-0.054
(0.64)

-0.305
(0.49)

-0.536**
(0.21)

-0.465**
(0.20)

Variable

HIV

YOUTH BULGE
EDUCATION SPENDING
COllstallt

Observations
R-squared

0.509
(0.74)
-0.0248
(0.061)

-0.0549
(0.078)

89.34***
(32.S)

102.5*'*
(24.6)

105
0.19

105
0.18

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<o.Ol, ** p<O.05, * p<O.l
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Conclusions
While my results lend credence to my theory that
political and social factors do play a part in migration
decisions, it seems unlikely that countries can use political tools to effectively regulate emigration. As most governments are concerned with stemming the brain drain,
I would hesitate to derive policy prescriptions from the
outcomes presented here; the regressions in Table I would
suggest that some of the more effective ways to reduce
tertiary emigration are to decrease the accountability of
government to the voice of its citizens and intimidate or
harm the least educated members of society. However, it is
encouraging to observe that though higher Physical Integrity scores are associated with higher overall emigration,
an increase along this scale decreases emigration for the
tertiary group, thus, somewhat alleviating the brain drain.
I can confidently refute my sixth hypothesis. which
states that rising HIV rates would induce emigration.
Although HIV clearly contributes to a decrease in
emigration, one should note that it takes a moderately
large increase in infection to achieve a small reduction in
emigration. Thus, governments still lose fewer workers by
fighting the epidemic than by allowing it to escalate and
increase mortality in the working population.
The inconsistencies in my results may be due to
shortcomings in the data; as Section 4 notes, the data for
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Table 5. Dependent Variable: Emigration Rates for Tertiary Education (using primary and secondary emigration rates as determinants)

Variable

Modell:
TERTIARY
EMIGRATION

SECONDARY EMIGRATION

Model 2:
(PRIMARY
EMIGRATION only)

0.651 **
(0.33)

Model 3:
(YOUTH BULGE
excluded)

Model 4:
(PRIMARY only,
no YOUTH BULGE

0.674**
(0.30)

0.349
(0.34)

1.310-*(0.30)

0.277
(0.33)

1.162***
(0.33)

-2.573**
( 1.06)

-2.601 **
( 1.13)

-2.771 **(0.81)

-3.485***
(0.94)

0.0000322
(0.000021 )

0.0000338
(0.000021 )

0.0000340*
(0.000019)

0.0000419**
(0.000019)

-0.0482
(0.32)

0.0246
(0.33)

-0.0718
(0.30)

-0.0660
(0.32)

MOVEMENT

2.569
(4.13)

3.861
(4.23)

2.570
(4.15)

4.066
(4.31 )

PHYSICAL INTEGRITY

-0.377
(0.61)

-0.443
(0.61)

-0.483
(0.50)

-0.926**
(0.45)

HIV

-0.219
(0.22)

-0.395*
(0.20)

-0.184
(0.19)

-0.264
(0.19)

YOUTH BULGE

0.284
(0.82)

1.135
(0.69)

EDUCATION SPENDING

-0.0063
(0.069)

-0.0452
(0.0786)

-0.0027
(0.0682)

-0.0354
(0.0770)

Constant

71.98*(29.8)

69.28-*
(30.7)

78.78-**
( 19.3)

99.13***
(23.1 )

Observations

105

105

105

105

R-squarcd

0.36

0.27

0.36

0.26

PRIMARY EMIGRATION
GNI LOG
FDI INFLOW
POLITY

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.OI, ** p<0.05, * p<O.1

primary and secondary education may be far less accurate
than the tertiary estimates. In addition, because this test was
run for one year rather than over a longer period of time,
some of my independent variables may not have had the
opportunity to take full effect. A time series model, had
enough data been available, might have given a clearer
picture. The greatest weakness of this study is that I am
likely to be missing one or multiple variables that are critical
to decisions to migrate (to OEeD countries). Some of these
might be difficult to quantity such as levels of nationalism
and language or geographical barriers. European countries
are situated such that they attract many more migrants from
India. Africa, and the Middle East, while large fractions
of U.S. immigration come from Mexico, South America,
the Pacific, and Asia. Proximity to a developed state makes
migration for economic reasons easier and cheaper. In
cases where political violence or civil war are push factors,
unprepared migrants are likely to move to the next state
over, not necessarily to a more economically advanced
country-thus, they are not well represented by the
Docquier-Marfouk.j, dataset. It is possible that apart from a
few common factors, there are so many different variables

affecting migration decisions that none of them will ever
become significant in a statistical analysis. Scholars tend
to draw unique conclusions from migration case studies,
so perhaps the specific interplay of motives behind each
case are different. If this is true, then quantitative methods
will do little to help us understand the brain drain or how
to control it. However, my analysis does provide a few
interesting and promising results about the varying effects
of political and social factors across education groups that
warrant further investigation. Additional research could
expand on my analysis by testing for other factors which
prompt migration or by conducting similar experiments with
more refined data on emigration as it becomes available.
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Appendix. Table 6. Correlation
TERT.
EMIG.

GNI
LOG

PRIM.
EMIG

SEC.
EMIG

FDI

MOVE.

PHYS.

SPEND.

YOUTH

HIV

TERTIARY
EMIGRATION
SECONDARY
EMIGRATION
PRIMARY
EMIGRATION
GNI LOG

0.2823

0.5624

1

-0.3617

-0.1377

0.0507

I

FOlINFLOW

-0.1262

-0.0739

0.OOS5

0.4939

1

POLITY

0.0095

O.ln5

0.3456

0.3049

0.2152

I

MOVEMENT
PHYSICAL
INTEGRITY
HIV

0.0842

0.1713

0.2192

0.142S

0.1467

0.6825

I

0.0588

0.1217

0.3806

-0.0206

0.2426

0.3504

O.39X4

I

-O.02S

-0.1574

-0.2723

-0.3407

-0.1043

-0.1465

-0.0941

-0.0868

I

0.1745

0.0063

-0.4405

-0.5905

-0.2962

-0.515

-0.3554

-0.4436

0.4696

I

-0.0581

-0.1036

-0.0629

-0.0118

-0.0308

-(l.()O99

-0.1125

-0.0532

0.0798

(U)758

YOUTH BULGE
EDUCATION
SPENDING

1
0.5060

1
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Rushin'to Join: The Case Of Russia's Accession
to the Council of Europe and the European
Court of Human Rights
Kasey Clemans
n 25 December 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved.
This event left fifteen republics, once united in a
powerful superpower structure, independent. Upon
independence, Russia quickly moved towards membership
in the Council of Europe (CE) and, therefore, became
subject to the judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR).ln light of the court's history,! and intemal
ethnic tensions in the Caucasus region, one might wonder
why Russia was so quick to voluntarily yield some of its
sovereignty to an international human rights institution. This
paper will show that Russia's move to join the ECHR was
primarily motivated by Boris Yeltsin's efforts to legitimize
his own rule.

O

Significance
Besides my personal interest in Russia and human
rights, why should anyone else care about Russia's reasons
for joining the ECHR? First, given Russia's past as a
communist country and its rough-and-tumble transition to
democracy, one might be curious as to why Russia was
so eager to join a strong international institution like the
ECHR." What did Russia have to gain by locking itself
into an international institution and surrendering some of
its sovereignty? Second, most of the literature on Russia's
relationship with the CE and the ECHR focuses on what
has transpired since Russia joined the CE and ratified
the ECHR. This paper will fill a gap in the literature
by shedding some light on the factors which pushed
Russia to join the CE and ratify the ECHR. Furthermore,
understanding why Russia joined the ECHR may provide
insights into whether or not Russia is likely to comply with
CE decisions and ECHR rulings, and how Russia might
best be influenced on human rights and democracy issues.
Finally, this paper may also broaden our understanding as

to how newly democratic states function and what the best
approach may be to incorporate them into the international
human rights regime.

Theories
The formation and willingness of states to participate
in strong international institutions typically starts with the
perspective that states are rational unitary actors. They
view human rights enforcement as a desirable outcome
within other states (at least) as well as in their own polity
(at best), but each state faces incentives to defect on its
own human rights protection when it wants to achieve another of its state goals. In order to overcome the tendency
to defect, states set up an international institution to handle human rights enforcement for them. In this way, they
all benefit from centralization, monitoring, and reduced
transaction costS. 3 Caroline Fehl points out that sovereignty costs are the major concern of states functioning as
rational actors. States do not want to give up control over
domestic policy, particularly if it affects how they interact
with their citizens.· This theory as applied to new democracies might suggest that new democracies do not have the
institutions to protect human rights or the means to develop
them. In order to fill this gap, they may sign on to an international institution to benefit from the existing mechanism.
Andrew Moravcsik's theory of "republican liberalism" postulates that new, unstable democracies will yield
sovereignty to an international institution because they
want to "lock-in" democratic practices. s This occurs because policymakers in a new, unstable democracy have
no guarantees about how long their government will retain power; therefore, they seek to prevent a change in
policy in the future by yielding sovereignty over human
rights policy to an international institution. Moravcsik
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points out that states faced with the idea of yielding sovereignty will most likely oppose it because they want to
maintain short-term control over policy. States are only
likely to yield sovereignty if they value greater political
certainty in the future more than short-term control over
policy. Thus, new, unstable democracies should be far
more eager to join binding international institutions than
established democracies. 6
Edward Mansfield, Jon Pevehouse, and Emilie
Hafner-Burton, building on Moravcsik, also suggest that
new democracies will be more likely to join international
organizations (lOs) protecting human rights than
established democracies. Where Mansfield, et al. differ
from Moravcsik is that they expect new democracies to
join lOs because these states also want to signal to their
own citizens, as well as the international community,
about their intentions of being a democracy in the future. 7
This signaling helps the state consolidate its position as a
democracy, showing that its democratic actions go beyond
words. Mansfield, et al. also propose that new democracies
join lOs because they are responding to positive incentives
from established democracies. 8
An alternate theory, put forth by Jay Goodliffe and
Darren Hawkins, proposes that states join human rights
regimes because they want to keep good relations with
states on whom they are dependent for various resources.
This dependence varies in intensity based on how much
value the given state places on the particular resource,
and how many alternatives they have for procuring that
resource. The underlying logic is that if state A supports
an international human rights institution, and state B depends on A for a critical resource, then B will be inclined
to accept the human rights institution so as to preclude
any possible sanctions from A.9 Goodliffe and Hawkins
go beyond looking at bilateral relations between states to
viewing states as members of networks with other states.
A clear explanation of why this may be important follows.
Given two states C and D are both new democracies, suppose that C is almost entirely dependent on A for a crucial
resource. In this situation, C will care strongly about A's
views on a particular human rights enforcement mechanism. Now, suppose D is dependent on a variety of states
including A. States C and D are both dependent on A, but
the degree of that dependence is different. Because of that
difference in dependence, C and D may have different attitudes towards the particular human rights institution favored by A. For newly established democracies to yield
sovereignty to an international human rights institution,
the proportion of their ties to states favoring the institution
must be greater than the proportion of their ties to those
states that do not favor the institution.
In his article, Moravcsik cites a realist perspective
that changes the dependence relationship above from one
based on anticipation by the dependent state, to one of
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coercion by a stronger state or group of stronger states. 10
Hans Morgenthau, E.H. Carr, and others claim that powerful states force weaker states to make decisions in line with
the powerful states' interests. Applied to new democracies
becoming members of an international human rights institution, this theory would expect them to be intimidated by
their more powerful cousins and submit to the powerful
states' demands that they join the particular institution.
In contrast to the realist perspective, there are a
number of idealist approaches to explaining states yielding
sovereignty to international human rights institutions.
These approaches would have us believe that some
governments are altruistic and recognize the value of
human rights and make the decision to join an 10 because
it will further advance the cause of human rights. Less
altruistic states may be influenced by domestic groups
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to the point
where they believe in the norms and move to enforce them
through an 10. 11
Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink propose that
states are socialized into enforcing human rights through
interactions with the domestic and international community.
These groups confront the particular state and publicize
its human rights abuses. The state, intent on preserving its
current policy, may deny the claims of international actors as
interference in its sovereignty. 1:; Iffaced by domestic actors,
the state may choose to repress them. Domestic groups may
be able to draw international attention to the human rights
abuses of the given government. With time, the state will
begin to make instrumental changes designed to appease
observers without really changing the status quo. 13 The fact
that the state makes any changes whatsoever lends support
to the human rights movement and increases its legitimacy.
Gradually, the state will begin to engage human rights
activists and international actors in a dialogue over what
it should do about human rights. Finally, the state will sign
on to various international conventions that protect human
rights and work to ensure that the rule of law consistently
applies to human rights violations.
Risse and Sikkink's point about states making instmmental changes is further extended by Darren Hawkins. U
Hawkins suggests that governments may make instmmental changes to their human rights policies because they are
seeking legitimacy. Furthermore, governments are not solely concerned with their domestic legitimacy but also with
their international legitimacy. They have three reasons for
their concern: First, support from other states strengthens
the government's right to mle a given state. New governments do not want to be seen as vulnerable or insecure by
their rivals. Second, governments are social entities. As an
international community, governments have accepted standards of behavior to which all legitimate governments must
adhere. As Martha Finnemore and Sikkink put it, "a state
which wants to define itself as a member of the commu-
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nity must act in accordance with the standard of appropriate behavior in the community."15 Third, governments
perceived as illegitimate may be subjected to international
sanction. Furthermore, a lack of support from the international cornmunity might engender greater opposition domestically. Hawkins continues with a list of behaviors that
legitimacy-seeking governments are likely to exhibit. They
may change government practices with respect to human
rights by eliminating murders or disappearances, ending
exile, pardoning political prisoners, and removing government officials who have clearly violated human rights
norms. Additionally, governments may institute a number of surface level changes to "show" that they are doing
more to protect human rights. Among these are creating a
new government office to protect human rights, drafting
a new constitution that includes human rights as a basic
tenet, increasing the independence of judicial institutions,
and improving security and/or intelligence agencies. The
important feature about all of these changes is that they
are meant to look good to international observers while
maintaining the government's control.
Another related explanation for Russia joining the
ECHR is that the CE signaled Russia that membership
in the CE and ratification of the ECHR were not costly.
Pamela 10rdan l6 claims that the CE is the "European organization with the fewest demands on its new entrants."
Perhaps Yeltsin recognized this and moved to become a
member assuming that membership would entail few
costs. One example of a signal would be current CE members not living up to their human rights commitments.
This would show that the CE does little more than talk
about human rights and is not dedicated to ensuring human rights' provision in member states. 18
Finally, there is the possibility that bounded rationality may offer insights into why a state may join a strong
human rights institution. Bounded rationality begins with
the premise that the rational faculties of human beings are
limited in terms of how much information they can sort
through in a given period of time. When decision makers
are confronted with more information than they have time
to evaluate, they are inclined to employ "inferential shortcuts" or "cognitive heuristics" to arrive at a decision more
quickly. I? In his article, Kurt Weyland evaluates the use of
cognitive heuristics to explain policy diffusion. He states:

I,

A bold innovation attracts disproportionate attention
from neighboring countries; it is then widely adopted on
the basis of its apparent promise, not its demonstrated
success. Large numbers of countries also import the
basic policy framework without thoroughly assessing
its fit with their specific requirements and needs. 20
In the current context, the policy in question is membership in the CE and the ECHR. Bounded rationality suggest
that one state made a bold move by joining the CE and

ECHR and that others followed without really considering the long-term effects of such an action. In connection
with the initial policy decision, there are both temporal
and geographic patterns of diffusion. The temporal pattern
indicates that a policy will be slowly adopted at first, followed by a rapid increase in the number of states adopting
it, and finally conclude with a plateau as most states have
either joined or decided not to based on updated information about the consequences of the policy. The geographic
pattern demonstrates that the policy originates in one state
and spreads outward through neighboring states.
In addition to these patterns, bounded rationality also
suggests that states make the decision to pursue the policy
in question based on limited information about the consequences of such a policy. They tend to look more at the
potentially positive effects of a given policy rather than
waiting to see how it functions in practice. Furthermore,
in adopting the given policy, states tend to apply the policy
quite similarly to the initial state's method despite varying political structures and social conditions. Even if the
policy is changed by the state adopting it, it will look more
or less like the original. This is true because the original
form of the policy biasing the other states' perceptions of
that policy in such a way that they do not realize that there
may be other methods for solving the particular problem.
Although states adopting the policy may change certain
parts of it to meet their needs, the policy adopted by successive states tends to strongly resemble the original policy adopted by the first state.

Hypotheses
I expect that Russia's move to join the ECHR was motivated not by Moravcsik's theory of republican liberalism,
but by Yeltsin's efforts to secure his own position. Yeltsin
wanted to bolster the legitimacy of his regime through
democratic reforms. At the time of independence, Russia
had seen the collapse of an ideology that had reigned supreme for more than seventy years. This collapse spurred
Russia's quest for a new identity as a democratic republic. As the democratically elected President of Russia,
Yeltsin was in the perfect position to lead the charge to
democracy. He knew that by pursuing democratic reforms
he could show the world that Russia wanted to become a
democracy. He also knew that by pursuing such a course
he could count on the support of the world's most powerful states. In attempts to make Russia a more democratic
state, he made a number of policy decisions in line with
patterns of behavior of existing democracies. One ofthese
decisions was to pursue membership in the CEo
I also expect that Yeltsin and his advisors did not anticipate the costs associated with joining the ECHR. This
would be explained by political leaders following what
other democratic states had done without sufficient time
to understand what would be required of Russia. Another
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possibility is that Russia understood the costs and was led
by CE signals to believe that they were insignificant. Russia became an observer of the CE in January 1992 and
applied for membership in May of that year. With less
than five months between the end of the Soviet Union and
the submission of Russia's application in the CE, circumstances seem indicative of Russia making a quick decision
based on other states behavior as opposed to signals from
the CEo
Finally, I reject a number of alternative theories for
why Russia would join the CE and ECHR. First, Russia
was not forced to join the ECHR by other more powerful
states. Perhaps other states did offer positive incentives as
Mansfield et al. suggest, however, the drive for Russia's
membership in the ECHR was not initiated by other states,
but by Russia itself. Moreover, I reject Moravcsik's idea
that Russia's leaders sought to "lock-in" human rights
enforcement out of political uncertainty in the future.
While they were indeed in an uncertain position, they
did not seek to tie the hands of some future governing
collective. Instead. Yeltsin was taking advantage of a
Western desire to see a democratic Russia.

Methods/Approach
In determining whether my hypotheses were correct,
I evaluated Russia's actions starting with its efforts to join
the CEo I followed Russia's membership application from
the beginning of 1992 up until 1996 and then continued
onward to its ratification of the ECHR in 1998. Then,
I followed Yeltsin's behavior until he stepped down in
1999. Direct evidence from Yeltsin's cabinet meetings and
records of State Duma discussions were unavailable, so I
relied heavily on the newspaper articles and reported interviews with Russian politicians. I also reviewed relevant
scholarship on Russia's relationship with the CEo Particularly, the work of Emma Gilligan was invaluable in
following the development of human rights protections
in Russia.

Evidence
I. Lock-in
Moravcsik's theory of "republican liberalism" postulates that new, unstable democracies will yield sovereignty
to an international institution because they want to "lockin" democratic practices. 21 This occurs because policymakers in a new, unstable democracy have no guarantees
about how long their government will retain power; therefore, they seek to prevent a change in policy in the future
by yielding some sovereignty over human rights policy to
an international institution. Moravcsik points out that states
faced with the idea of yielding sovereignty will most likely
oppose it because they want to maintain short-term control
over policy. States are only likely to yield sovereignty if
they value greater political certainty in the future more than
short-term control over policy. Thus, new, unstable democ38

racies should be far more eager to join binding international
institutions than established democracies.""
First, the events which took place in Russia from
1992 to 1993 demonstrate that Russia is clearly a new,
unstable democracy. With the August 1991 coup attempt
against Mikhail Gorbachev and the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Yeltsin began 1992 as the
President of a newly independent Russia. Yeltsin enjoyed
a great deal of popular support for standing in front of
the tanks in opposition to the August coup and for being
elected by the people as the President of Russia. However, his administration was not the only major force in
Russian politics. His regime faced daunting opposition
from Vladimir Zhirinovsky, head ofthe nationalist Liberal
Democratic Party, as well as opposition from a congress
where Communist deputies filled 85 percent of the seats.
Yeltsin's main rival for control of Russian politics was
Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov of the Congress of People's
Deputies. These leaders competed for primacy in an unsure arena. As a result, the battle between the president
and the parliament pushed the country into a constitutional
crisis. As Richard Sakwa states, because of a 1990 amendment to the 1978 Russian constitution, "both the executive and the parliament were given supreme state power.
Russia was de jure a parliamentary republic but de facto
became a presidential republic."23 As a result, both parliament and the president sought to strip the other institution of its authority. At the Eighth Congress in March
1993, Khasbulatov and the parliament stripped Yeltsin of
most of his powers and made it possible for his administration to bypass him in introducing legislation. 24 Yeltsin
responded by proceeding with a national referendum asking Russians about their support for his reform policies
and when they felt elections should be called for the president and for the parliament. This referendum renewed
Yeltsin's popular support. He used his new mandate to
convene a constitutional assembly. Unfortunately, once
the draft was completed, parliament still did not pass it.
Finally, on 21 September 1993, Yeltsin issued decree No.
1400 "On Gradual Constitutional Reform in the Russian
Federation." This decree dissolved the Supreme Soviet
and Congress of People's Deputies and transferred the
responsibilities of parliament to the newly created Federal Assembly with the Federation Council becoming the
upper house and the State Duma the lower house. Elections for the State Duma were scheduled for 12 December 1993. The legislature's response to Yeltsin's actions
was armed revolt and refusal to leave the White House.
Amid protests and demonstrations, Yeltsin succeeded in
convincing the military to intervene and stop armed supporters of parliament from seizing various assets across
the city. Khasbulatov and other rebel leaders surrendered
and were imprisoned. According to Sakwa, these actions
"complet[ ed] the revolution of August 1991. Neither the
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banning of the Communist Party, nor the dissolution of
parliament were strictly speaking constitutional acts, but
while deficient in legality, they clearly commanded a high
degree of public legitimacy. "25 The people turned out for
the 12 December 1993 elections and voted in favor of
adopting the new constitution. This new constitution resolved the constitutional crisis by increasing the powers
of the presidency and clarifying the roles of the executive
and the new Federal Assembly.
The purpose of the historical account above is to demonstrate that Russia fits Moravcsik's definition of a new,
unstable democracy. Its institutions were weak and clearly
contradictory. Furthermore, Yeltsin and other reformers
faced bitter opposition from within the parliament. Having established that Russia is a new, unstable democracy,
let us see if there is evidence to support Moravcsik's idea
of republican liberalism.
Moravcsik's argument implies a greater concern
for policy implementation than for the current regime to
maintain control over human rights. Given that premise,
we should see Yeltsin and his administration pursuing
policies that entrench human rights protection in the
Russian system. They would be looking for ways to force
their potential successors to support human rights. We
should also see Russia pursuing additional avenues for
locking in human rights protection such as joining other
human rights institutions beyond the ECHR. Furthermore,
if Moravcsik's argument about new, unstable democracies
is correct and Yeltsin's regime was seeking for long-term
certainty in human rights enforcement, then we should
expect Russia to have joined the ECHR and other human
rights institutions rapidly.

Declaration on the Rights and Liberties of Man and the Citizen
My research has shown that Yeltsin did pursue other
methods of incorporating human rights into domestic policy.
Part of his 1993 draft of the constitution was Section Two,
"On the Rights and Liberties of Man and the Citizen." This
document had been under development since 1990 under the
auspices of the Human Rights Committee of the Congress
of People's Deputies. Despite the efforts of Yeltsin and
members of the Human Rights Committee, the CPD refused
to accept the document as a binding declaration within
the ramifications of the constitution. With the dissolution
of parliament, the full version of "The Declaration of the
Rights and Liberties of Man and the Citizen" was included
in the 1993 constitution and later ratified. This document
laid the foundations for human rights in Russia. Its main
provisions included the right to life and protection against
torture; the right to a fair trial, presumption of innocence
of defendants, prohibition of forced labor; freedom of
association, peaceable assembly, thought. conscience, and
religion; and the right to participate in state politics by
electing and being elected. 26

Human Rights Commissioner
In addition to including a Bill of Rights for the Russian people, the new constitution created a human rights
commissioner. The commissioner was given three responsibilities: 1) investigate human rights abuses, 2) pressure
state organs to improve legislation on human rights, and
3) educate citizens about their human rights and how to
defend them.:!' The commissioner was to be appointed by
the State Duma and was to act according to a forthcoming federal constitutional law. Yeltsin signed the "Federal Constitutional Law on the Commissioner for Human
Rights in the Russian Federation" into law on 26 February
1997. It clarifies the role of the commissioner and grants
him a number of protections from other government institutions. Among these, Article 12.1 states:
The Commissioner possesses inviolability for the
course of the entire term of his powers. Without the
consent of the State Duma, he cannot be prosecuted
under criminal or administrative charges, be subject
to court procedures, be detained, be arrested, be subject to searches, excluding cases of detention at the
scene of a crime, or be subject to personal interrogation, excluding cases when this is stipulated by federallaw for the defence of the security of other persons.
The inviolability of the Commissioner applies to his
residential and work premises, baggage, personal and
work means of transport, correspondence, means of
communication used by him, and documents belonging to him.28
Unless prosecuting authorities receive permission of the
State Duma within twenty-four hours, the commissioner
must be released even if the commissioner is located at
the scene of a crime. The creation of the office of human
rights commissioner and the successive passing offurther
legislation to strengthen the position shows that Yeltsin's
regime sought to increase the degree to which human
rights were protected in domestic legislation.

Presidential Human Rights Commissioner
As a result of the dissolution of the CPD, the Human Rights Committee, which was part of that body, was
dissolved as well. Five days after dissolving parliament,
Yeltsin created a new Presidential Human Rights Commission. This commission's purpose was to establish the core
upon which the human rights commissioner's office would
function once the necessary constitutional law was passed.
Upon installment of the human rights commissioner, the
Presidential Human Rights Commission would remain as
an advisory body to the president. Because the Presidential
Human Rights Commission was a temporary structure from
the beginning, few politicians took it seriously. Its position
in Russian politics was further damaged by the failure to
adequately handle the first real case it investigated. 29 It was
also heavily criticized for its leaders' lack of organization.
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Ratification of the ECHR
Another point of evidence in support of Moravcsik's
argument is the relative speed with which Russia ratified
the ECHR once it became a member of the CEo Russia was
admitted to the CE on 28 February 1996. Deliberation over
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms lasted just over two years. Primary
concerns of delegates in the State Duma were over existing
legislation which would need to be amended. 30 They also
expressed doubt over the Russian legal system's ability
to meet international standards. 31 In genera!, however,
the representatives favored adoption of the convention.
Their concerns are best viewed as a desire to fulfill
commitments entered into, rather than reservations about
the convention. The reservations entered upon ratification
of the convention state that they are only in effect until
such time as domestic legislation can be brought into
agreement with the convention.

Death Penalty
One significant example of Yeltsin's personal efforts to enhance human rights protection is his repeated
attempts to eliminate the death penalty. Parties to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are also expected to ratify Protocol 6
which abolishes the death penalty. When the State Duma
ratified the convention in April 1997, it discussed Protocol
6, but ultimately did not ratify it for fear that public sentiment in Russia was against abolishing the death penalty.
In July of that year, Yeltsin submitted an amendment to
allow death sentences to be carried out only if they are
approved by the prosecutor general and the supreme court
chairman. 32 In January of 1998, Yeltsin signed an amendment to the penal code which would force him to review
the cases of all those sentenced to death, even if they had
not requested clemency.33 A few weeks later, the Supreme
Court ruled that the death penalty could no longer be exacted except by jury.3" However, the jury system was only
implemented in nine of the eighty-nine regions, so the
court put a moratorium on the regions with the jury system
as well until such time as it could be introduced in all regions. This effectively placed a moratorium on the use of
the death penalty. However, that was not enough for President Yeltsin. In June 1999, he signed a decree which commuted existing death sentences to prison terms. 35 Finally,
in August 1999, just three months before he stepped down,
Yeltsin renewed efforts to push ratification of Protocol 6
through the State Duma. However, the State Duma did not
follow through on the proposed legislation, and Protocol
6 remains unratified by Russia to the present day. Yeltsin's
efforts to abolish the death penalty in Russia were numerous and frequent. He used every means available to act in
accordance with the ideals of the CE to keep people from
being executed.
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Lingering questions remain about Yeltsin's true intentions. Did he genuinely care about human rights? Was his
obedience to CE requirements based on a desire to protect
human rights or was it based on his own desire for international legitimacy? Was the war in Chechnya an exception to the rule or the exposure of his true character?
Were concerns over maintaining his position as president
in the 1996 elections a driving force behind his actions in
Chechnya? The next section will examine available information in an effort to resolve these questions.

II. Legitimacy
An alternative explanation to Moravcsik's idea of
"lock-in" is that Yeltsin pursued human rights reforms as a
method for boosting his own popularity and legitimacy. By
joining the CE, Yeltsin could, as Jordan states, "legitimize
[his] new regime.":lG Yeltsin was most concerned with his
own political career and, therefore, sought ways to influence how he was viewed abroad. The purpose of joining the
CE was to garner support from the international community that would strengthen him against domestic political
opponents. Yeltsin was a political opportunist who boldly
gambled by opposing the coup in 1991, and later capitalized
on the dissolution of the Soviet Union. January 1992 found
him in the perfect position to take advantage of international naivete. To all Western observers, the evil empire had
finally fallen. They could only hope that from the remnants
of the superpower would be born a new democracy.
During his two terms in office, Yeltsin made use
of his image as a democratic reformer on the world
stage. He knew that by acting the part of a democratic
leader, he would garner tremendous support from the
most powerful and wealthy states in the world. In terms
of Russian domestic political structures, Yeltsin faced
tremendous opposition from Communist and Nationalist
factions within the parliament. Preeminent among
parliamentarians was Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov.
As previously mentioned, Khasbulatov spent 1992 and
1993 vying for political supremacy in Russia. In the end,
Yeltsin went around the existing constitution to disband
the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's
Deputies. Furthermore, he called out the military and
urged them to attack the holed-up parliamentarians in
the Russian White House. This debacle resulted in the
deaths of 146 people in a single day.3' Although many
Russian citizens strongly disliked their parliamentary
leaders, they still criticized Yeltsin for the violent manner
in which he handled the situation. Despite the negative
impact on Yeltsin's domestic legitimacy, he went on
almost unscathed in the international scene. The Council
of Ministers' statement is particularly striking:
We, Heads of State and Government of CE member
States ... express our deep concern over recent events
in the Russian Federation. We deplore the heavy loss
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of life which resulted from the resort to violence,
provoked by opponents of reform.
We declare our solidarity with the supporters of the
reforms under the leadership ofPresident Boris Yeltsin
and express hope that the process of democratization
will be continued with determination. 38
In spite of the fact that his methods in resolving the conflict were both violent and unconstitutional, the CE supported Yeltsin and believed that by so doing they were
supporting democratic reforms. The rest of this section
will demonstrate how Yeltsin used human rights to foster
his own political security.

Elections
One of the stipulations for membership in the CE
was that Russia held free and fair elections. Yeltsin did
this in accordance with the stipulation of the council.
Initially, the agreement Yeltsin made was that both
presidential and parliamentary elections would take place.
But after the parliamentary elections of December 1993,
Yeltsin managed to forget to hold presidential elections
six months later as he had promised. 39 This shows that
Yeltsin complied entirely with the council's requirement,
but was able to renege on a related promise he had made
in domestic circles to hold presidential elections. Thus,
he was able to reduce his chances of being removed from
power and he gained additional international legitimacy.
1993 Constitution
In conjunction with the elections, there is the issue
of the 1993 constitution itself. When Yeltsin disbanded
parliament, he was able to put forward his own draft of
the constitution for the December 1993 referendum. This
version of the constitution included the previously mentioned "Declaration of the Rights and Liberties of Man
and the Citizen." Besides including protection of human
rights in the document, Yeltsin added a number of key features to bolster the power of the president relative to the
parliament. Among these were the power of the president
to issue legally binding decrees not subject to State Duma
approval and the power to dissolve parliament if they rejected his nomination for prime minister three successive
times. The strength of the president was a major concern
for parliament during the 1993 battle over constitutional
reform. They feared that such a powerful presidency in the
wrong hands would leave Russia under the control of an
autocrat. While the 1993 constitution did not force Yeltsin
to choose between including human rights protections and
his own political gain, it is illustrative that he was adept at
pursuing human rights while at the same time improving
his political prospects.
Presidential Human Rights Commission Revisited
Besides looking at the Presidential Human Rights
Commission as a positive step towards entrenching human

rights in Russia, it may also be viewed from the standpoint of Yeltsin's own political interests. When Yeltsin
disbanded the parliament, its Human Rights Committee
also ceased to exist. This void left Yeltsin with the opportunity to create a new institution that was both within
his administration and entirely dependent upon him for
support. A noteworthy case that demonstrates the failure
of the Presidential Human Rights Commission to improve
the application of human rights practices surfaced when
Yeltsin issued the "Decree on Banditry." Contrary to the
constitution, the decree allowed searches without warrants, detention without appearing before a judge or even
being charged for up to thirty days, wire taps, and access
for law enforcement personnel to banking and commercial documents of suspected criminals without a warrant. -10 In response to this decree, Sergei Kovalyov, head
of the Presidential Human Rights Commision, made impassioned pleas to Yeltsin via letters, a television interview, and a vigorous press campaign against the decree.
Yeltsin's only response was to allow Kovalyov to form a
monitoring group. This episode marks a turning point in
Yeltsin and Kovalyov's relationship from two men united
by principles, to two men divided by politics.
Why would Yeltsin, a champion of human rights,
not intervene once he understood the ramifications of
his decree? The answer is simple: crime. At this time,
politicians across the spectrum were concerned about the
rampant increase in criminal activity. From 1988 to 1994
the number of registered crimes rose from 1,220362 to
2,632,708, an increase of more that 200 percent in six years
time. -ll Large segments of the population were concerned
over crime and wanted to see public officials take decisive
action against it. Yeltsin knew this and decided to issue
the aforementioned decree. His act shows once again
that political expediency is more important to him than
bolstering human rights. He refused to even entertain the
idea that law enforcement could be improved without
resorting to violating the citizen's human rights.

Chechnya
Up until 1994, Yeltsin's administration had a decent
record on human rights. There were still rampant human
rights abuses across the country, but Yeltsin was actively
working with Kovalyov and other human rights advocates
to address these issues. With the beginning of the first
Chechen War in November 1994, Yeltsin and Kovalyov
began moving in different directions. Yeltsin was deeply
concerned over public opinion and could not afford
to appear soft on crime or separatism. Kovalyov was
determined to see that human rights were protected. When
Russian troops began attacking Chechnya, Kovalyov
decided to go to Chechnya to see what was going on. His
efforts to get to Chechnya were repeatedly blocked. First,
he was unable to book seats on a flight to the Chechen
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capital Grozny. Then, the First Vice-Premier called to
inform him that he could get Kovalyov and his working
group seats on a plane the following day. However, there
were only five seats available. In choosing who would
go, Kovalyov made certain that he had representatives
from across the political spectrum in his party so that the
majority of Duma legislators would be willing to listen
to the working group's conclusions. On their way to
Chechnya, the plane was told that they would not be able
to land in Mozduk, because of ice on the runway and were
instead diverted to Chkalovskaya. When they arrived, they
saw a mail carrier plane that was headed to Mozduk, but
were refused permission to take the flight. The next day
the group was turned back yet again. Finally, they went
to a civilian airport and took a flight landing them within
driving distance ofChechnya and then made the rest ofthe
trip by car. The lengths that Kovalyov and his team were
forced to go to in order to get to Chechnya indicate that
some leaders in Moscow did not want them to see what
was actually happening in Chechnya.
Upon arrival in Chechnya, Kovalyov and his
working group were stunned by the lack of effort made
for constructive dialogue. Even more troubling was
the lack of provisions made by Russian forces to allow
civilians to flee Grozny. Before any attempt at dialogue
was made, Russian aircraft began bombing the city.
Kovalyov pointed to numerous bombs and rockets that
hit civilian areas of the city where there were no military
installations. His impassioned pleas to Yeltsin to stop
the bombing and to attempt to resolve the issues without
resorting to force went unheeded. At this point Yeltsin
was actively supporting positive propaganda about the
war effort in Chechnya. In contrast, Kovalyov and his
working group were doing all they could to disseminate
information on the human rights abuses-particularly the
high levels of civilian casualties in Chechnya. Besides
ignoring Kovalyov's pleas, leaders back in Moscow began
an intensive campaign vilifying Kovalyov as a dissident.
Upon his return to Moscow, Kovalyov asked for a meeting
with Yeltsin and was rejected. Upon threatening to reveal
to the press that the president had refused to meet with
him, Yeltsin's aide called back a short time later and set
the meeting for the following day.
The meeting between Yeltsin and Kovalyov provided
the final break between the two actors who had worked
together on human rights issues many times previously.
Kovalyov stressed the impact the bombings were having on the civilian popUlation and Yeltsin responded that
Kovalyov had poor information and that the bombings had
stopped. Yeltsin made it clear that he would not be working with Kovalyov to resolve the Chechen conflict or its
attendant human rights abuses. J2 For the first time, KovaIyov had to go outside of the presidency to find support for
his efforts to end human rights abuses. He decided to work
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through Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. He sent
Chernomyrdin a proposal for a cease-fire in Chechnya. A
few days letter, Chernomyrdin presented the proposal to
the Chechen side via a television broadcast. On the 17'h
of January, Chernomyrdin met with Chechen representatives in Moscow. They decided that the cease-fire would
begin the following day at 5 P.M. Despite these efforts,
Russian military leaders did not show up for scheduled
meetings with Chechen officials on the 18 th of January.
Furthermore, Yeltsin issued a statement saying the he was
not willing to negotiate with Dzhokhar Dudayev, leader
of the Chechen forces, because Dudayev was committing
genocide against his own people. J3 Fighting commenced
again the following day.
In a last-ditch effort to stop the violence in Chechnya,
Kovalyov brought the case before the Constitutional Court.
The key issue was a secret decree which Yeltsin had issued
on 30 November 1994 to institute a state of emergency in
Chechnya. The entire military campaign in Chechnya was
based on this decree. Because Yeltsin issued the decree
in secret, he had violated constitutional provisions which
required that the State Duma approve any declaration of a
state of emergency. The situation was further complicated
by Yeltsin's secret rescindment of the decree, on 5
December, after he signed the Organization of Security
and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) Code of MilitaryPolitical Aspects of Security. By signing this document,
Yeltsin agreed that "any decision about the direction of its
armed forces for the execution of intemal security will be
taken in accordance with constitutional proceedings."JJ
Yeltsin then made another decree without any mention
of a state of emergency on 9 December. In its ruling, the
Constitutional Court rejected references to the 30 November
decree because it had now been abolished. Furthermore, the
court supported Yeltsin's right to "ensure state security."JS
The court also said that the 9th of December decree did not
violate the constitution and recommended that the State
Duma pass a more comprehensive set oflaws for governing
the use of Russian military within Russia. JG In summary,
Kovalyov's last hope for correcting human rights abuses by
the Russian military failed to produce any change.
In response to his defeat before the Constitutional
Court and Yeltsin's unyielding devotion to continued
military action in Chechnya, Kovalyov tendered his
resignation on 23 January 1995. The text of his resignation
letter to President Yeltsin follows:
You began your democratic career as a forceful and
energetic crusader against official deceit and Party
despotism, but you are ending it as the obedient
executor of the will of the power-seekers in your
entourage .... I considered myself obliged to remain
in your administration as long as my status enabled
me on occasion, even if only in isolated instances, to
counteract government policies that had violated human
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rights and humanitarian values. Perhaps even now such
opportunities have not been totally exhausted. But I
can't go on working with a president whom I believe to
be neither a supporter of democracy nor a guarantee of
the rights and liberties of my fellow citizens. I hereby
inform you that, as of today, I resign as Chairman of the
President's Human Rights Commission, as a member
of the Presidential Council, and as a member of all
other presidential bodies.·"
Kovalyov's resignation is a stunning indictment ofYeItsin
and his policies. Until the conflict in Chechnya began,
Yeltsin appeared to be a stalwart supporter of human
rights initiatives, often pushing them forward in the face of
tremendous opposition from the State Duma. He worked
together with Kovalyov on a wide variety of issues. They
succeeded in including a Bill of Rights in the December
1993 constitution. I cannot help but agree with Kovalyov's
assessment of Yeltsin's character. Yeltsin was good at
supporting human rights when they furthered his political
agenda. Unfortunately, when Yeltsin's political future came
into conflict with human rights protection he consistently
ran roughshod over his previously professed principles.
The evidence listed in this section clearly points in favor
of legitimacy-seeking. As predicted by Hawkins. Yeltsin
implemented a number of instrumental changes which he
could use to show that he was forwarding human rights.
Foremost among these are his drafting of a new constitution
which includes human rights and his creation of a weak
Presidential Human Rights Commission. Additionally, he
also made sure it was publicized when he closed the last
gulag and freed Russia's "last" political prisoner.·s Overall,
the period from 1992 to 1999 is replete with Yeltsin's efforts
to legitimize his own rule.

III. Signals from the CE
An explanation for Russia joining the ECHR related
to that of legitimacy is that the CE signaled Russia that
membership in the council and ratification of the ECHR
were not costly. The following sections evaluate potential
signals from Russia in terms of how costly membership in
the CE and later the ECHR would be.

Signals of Wish
The primary evidence for the CE signaling Russia
that it would not be held accountable for its actions comes
from observing current member states. From the time
that Russia joined the CE, it was under pressure to ratify
Protocol 6 and abolish the death penalty. This is particularly
important given that long-time members such as Great
Britain, Turkey, and Cyprus had not abolished the death
penalty yet and were not being sanctioned by the council.· 9
Russia could look at those cases and decide that it might
be able to ignore the council's statements with impunity.
Even the Secretary General of the CE recognized that

"none of the thirty-nine members are fully implementing
to the letter the obligations they undertake."50
Another important factor is that the council was willing
to overlook numerous human rights violations continuing
in Russia even as it admitted Russia to the council. The
official opinion of the council was that Russia did not
meet the criteria for membership, but perhaps member
states would be able to have more of an impact on Russia
if it were a member state, than if it were an outsider. As
a result, numerous flagrant human rights violations were
overlooked. Furthermore, it is worth bearing in mind that
many of the states felt that approving Russia's accession
to the CE was a direct reflection on their approval for
President Boris Yeltsin's democratic reforms.

Signals of Will
The CE repeatedly increased the requirements which
Russia would have to meet in order to become a member of the CEo In July 1993, the CE specified that Russia
would need to hold free and fair parliamentary elections
and adopt a new constitution before it could accede to the
CE.51 Russia accomplished both of these feats in December 1993. Then in January 1994, the CE made Russia's
withdrawal of troops from Latvia, Estonia, and Moldova a
precondition for membership in the council. 52 After completing this requirement, Russia was certain that it would
be readily admitted to the CEo However, the unfolding of
war in Chechnya forced the CE to rethink its position. In
February 1995, the council decided to "freeze" Russia's
application for membership until such a time as Russia
could show that hostilities in Chechnya had ceased. 53 Only
with the announcement of a cease-fire was Russia granted
membership in the CE on 28 February 1996. These incidents clearly show that the CE made demands of Russia in
order for Russia to become a member. Each of these signals presented a tangible cost to the Russian government.
In order to become a member of the CE it had to change
its constitution, pull troops out of three foreign countries,
and negotiate a cease-fire in a domestic war. What is particularly remarkable is not only that Russia yielded to each
of the council's requirements, but the relative speed with
which Russia implemented them. In each case, Russia
complied within six to twelve months of notification of
the requirements. Clearly, both the demands of the council and the concessions made by Russia officials were extremely significant.

IV. Bounded Rationality
In his article on policy diffusion, Weyland describes
the spread of policy from one country to another as a wave.
He says that the wave begins slowly, then quickly increases, and then levels off. This cumulative frequency curve of
countries adopting a given policy is roughly S-shaped. 5•
The absolute frequencies for countries adopting a particular
policy in a given time frame should look like a bell curve.
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He further postulates that these waves of policy distribution tend to be localized to a given region. The policy
may start in one country and then spread to neighboring
countries. In the case of Russia joining the CE, both the
temporal and geographic relationships that he discusses
are replicated. The chart below shows that the cumulative frequency of states joining the CE approximates an
S-curve. The process begins slowly from 1989 to 1992,
but rapidly increases between 1992 and 1997, at which
point it slows down again significantly. The absolute
frequencies of states joining the CE in a given year also
match the bell curve that he discusses. The chart shows
that an approximate bell shape could be drawn with its
peak around 1994.
Weyland also discusses how waves spread geographically. In the case of eastern European states
joining the CE, this expectation also holds true. The
wave starts in Finland in 1989, moves through a number of eastern European states, then the Baltic states,
then southeastern European states, eventually covering
Ukraine and Russia and ending up in the Caucasus. I
found that the temporal and geographic relationships
were the only parts of his theory which readily applied
to Russia joining the CE and the ECHR.
Next, there is the idea that states follow other states
III implementing a particular policy while at the same
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time being ignorant of the potentially negative consequences of the new policy. In Russia's case, it is clear that
politicians knew going into the process what membership
in the council would entail. This is demonstrated by numerous public statements from Russian politicians. The
most prominent of these was given by Foreign Minister
Andrei Kozyrev in 1992 when he delivered Russia's application for accession to the council. He said, "Russia
will recognize the obligatory jurisdiction of the European
Court and the right of citizens to submit individual petitions, and develop cooperation within the framework of
the European Charter on Fundamental Social Rights."55
Thus, the obligations to which Russia would be held
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should have come as no surprise. Furthermore, the sheer
length of time that it took Russia to actually be accepted
as a member casts heavy doubt on politicians' ability to be
ignorant of the consequences of membership. While it is
possible that they initially did not expect membership in
the CE or ECHR to cost a great deal, the previously listed
evidence, about strong signals from the CE, shows that
Russia had a four-year period of interaction with the CE in
which it did exact heavy costs from Russia.
Given the policy decision of whether or not a state
joins the ECHR, there is no variance in how a state decides to join. It may decide to apply for membership or
not. Since there is no variance in this policy question, it
seems clear that this particular component does not apply
to Russia's membership in the CE or ECHR.

Conclusions
This paper shows that although Yeltsin participated in a
number of human rights measures, his overall intent points
more to political expediency and efforts to legitimize his
rule rather than efforts to lock-in human rights practices.
He sought democratic reforms and improvements in
human rights that would be noticed by international actors
and bolster their support for him, thus securing his own
position. Further evidence for this idea was demonstrated
by Yeltsin's lack of attention to human rights in particular
as they concerned crime prosecution procedures and
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efforts to protect civilians in Chechnya. Thus, I find that
my first hypothesis is strongly supported.
Additionally, while arguments can be made for both
strong signals and weak signals from the CE, the preconditions Russia had to meet in order to become a member
provide convincing evidence that the council sent signals
that it was not going to provide international legitimacy
for Russia. Russia had to pay the costs of membership and
resolve substantial issues with respect to current implementation of human rights practices. Bounded rationality provides a good explanation for how Russia learned
about the CE and its membership prospects. Also, the
data provide evidence that states in eastern Europe joined
the CE as a part of a wave of policy diffusion. The data
from the section on CE signals contradict the idea that
Russia was ignorant of the potential costs of membership
in the CE and ECHR. Russia was put through a four-year
probation during which the CE successfully demanded
changes in Russian policy. Thus, my second hypothesis
was strongly rejected.
A final caveat to these findings is in order. The data
used in supporting and rejecting the research hypotheses
was based heavily on newspaper reports of events as they
occurred in Russia. While the articles are numerous and
agree on almost every account, they only represent the
public side of Russia's move to join the CE and ECHR.
Information from Yeltsin's personal conversations and
State Duma sessions would provide valuable insight to the
validity of this research.
Despite my findings that Yeltsin pursued membership
in the CE and the ECHR to secure his own legitimacy, the
fact that the CE was able to exact changes out of Russia
is still significant. As Hawkins states, these changes may
very well create the room for groups genuinely interested
in furthering human rights to push their agenda forward. 56
My hope is that future research will explore further
development of domestic and international human rights
pressures on Russia to evaluate whether the CE made the
right decision in allowing Russia to become a member in
1996 or if it should have continued demanding reforms
until Russia met a higher standard.
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Beyond Democracy: The Effects of the Electoral
System on Environmental Performance -----,
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T

here have been many attempts to explain why some
countries exhibit environmentally friendly attitudes
and pass environmentally protective policies while
others neglect or exploit their natural resources and
environmental amenities. Some researchers have explored the link between democracy and the environment,
determining that there is only a relationship in certain
aspects of environmental protection. I Others have linked
environmental attitudes to economic growth or gross
domestic product (GDP).2 These studies, however, often
fail to explain the variance among countries with similar
ideological trends, income levels, or levels of democracy.
There are important conclusions to be drawn from further examining democratic governments and variances
within these democratic systems and electoral processes.
It is instructive not only to recognize that democracies in
general create greener policies, but to analyze both the
mechanisms and the institutional variance which allow
for these policy differences.
Within democracies, we look at electoral systems as
a central indicator of environment performance. We examine the differences between first past the post (FPTP)
and proportional representation (PR) styles of democracy, and we argue that those countries that utilize PR
systems exhibit better environmental attitudes and policies. Using the existing literature, we first explain key
differences in the two electoral systems and then highlight several causal mechanisms that may explain why
PR systems produce more environmentally friendly policies. We then explain the methodology of the quantitative study and discuss our findings. We spend significant
time on the main independent variable of electoral system. While the mere presence of an FPTP or PR system
does not explain the variance in environmental perfor-

mance, we do show that higher district magnitude, a
more sophisticated measure of a PR system, yields better
environmental performance.

Electoral System
The notion behind PR elections is that each party
should be allotted a number of congressional seats commensurate with the percentage of votes received. While,
technically, PR systems should precisely transfer the percentage of the votes won to the percentage of seats allotted to a certain party, such a policy could lead to a party's
receiving only half of a seat. Consequently, many systems
include some minimum percentage of the vote, a "threshold," that must be reached in order for a party to gain a
seat. The competing electoral system that we examine is
FPTP, a plurality system in which the one open seat goes
to the candidate that captures the most votes, although
not necessarily a majority. This type of system tends to
marginalize smaller parties, as the likelihood of a small
party winning one available seat is low. 3 PR systems, on
the other hand, will encourage multiparty politics due to
the inclusion of small parties. For example, if a "green"
party wins 10 percent of the vote in a PR system, it will
receive about 10 percent of the seats in the legislature,
whereas a plurality system would deny any representation. 4 This fragmentation of the vote in PR systems also
places a greater focus on a coalition approach to politics,
as can be seen in Europe and Latin America, where it is
most popular.s Plurality eschews this approach, as evidenced by the dominance of two major parties in the U.S.
and Great Britain.
Of particular importance to understanding electoral
systems, and specifically the way we measure them in
this paper, is the definition of district magnitude. This
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tenn refers to the average number of candidates elected
in each given district. In a plurality system, each district
elects only one representative in what is appropriately
called a single-member district. PR systems, however,
allow voters to elect multiple candidates per district,
ranging from two to as many as 150 in Slovakia and the
Netherlands." As John Carey7 points out, district magnitude determines the proportionality of a system, or the
ratio of seats to votes. We hypothesize that, to an extent,
higher district magnitude will lead to more equal proportionality and increase the number of parties gaining at
least some level of participation.

Environmental Performance and FPTP Systems
Given these characteristics of the two main electoral
systems, there are two reasons to expect that environmental
perfonnance would be worse in countries with a plurality
system. First, plurality systems require that candidates
appeal to a broad constituency for whom the environment
may not be a common concern. Second, the structure of
plurality systems tend to marginalize smaller, single-issue
parties that may favor the environment.
As previously addressed, FPTP systems require a
party to win more of the vote than the competing parties;
therefore, FPTP systems create a significant barrier to
entry unparalleled in PR systems. In order to obtain such
large percentages, parties must focus their campaigning
efforts on issues that will attract large numbers of voters.
Allan Meltzer and Marc VellrathH suggest that voters give
the most consideration to the question: "Which party
will keep the country prosperous in the years ahead?" In
addition to the focus on economic perfonnance that this
question prompts, Michelle SIone 9 argues that recently
within the U.S., the increased amount of media coverage
dedicated to terrorist threats and attacks has made
national security a detennining factor in elections that is
just as important as the economy. There are likely other
countries with similarly unique issues that directly play
into voter decisions and priorities. With pressing issues,
such as, security and the economy, at stake in FPTP
systems voters are less likely to cast their votes based on
a party's environmental stance. While we acknowledge
that there are some voters who make electoral decisions
based on environmental issues, they are a small enough
minority so as to not affect elections in any major way
in a plurality system. When parties consider the relative
disinterest with which voters view the environment, they
are unlikely to make environmental issues a major plank in
their campaign platfonn, as it does not develop the broad
support base that FPTP systems require. As a respondent
notes in Peter Smith's Democracy in Latin America, "The
single-member district does not guarantee the proportional
representation of parties, but in exchange it is the best at
allowing the representation of the interests that really stir
48

society."lo Regardless of which party wins the election in
a plurality system, environmental policies will not usually
be at the forefront of the agenda and the lack of protective
policy implementation will yield worse environmental
performance in the country involved.
Concomitant with this idea of broad appeal is the
parties' need to appeal to "swing" voters. In FPTP systems,
each party tends to contain a core group of committed
voters who will vote for the party irrespective of which
candidate is fielded. Therefore, the most pressing issue for
most parties is their ability to woo undecided or "swing"
voters. David Gopoian and Sisse Hadjiharalambous show
that these swing voters, defined as those who make their
decision in the last two weeks, are not generally motivated
by typical political or ideological issues. Instead, the
majority of these voters make their selections seemingly
at random, and display a tendency to vote for "the person
who saw them last on Election Day."11 Holding this
hypothesis true, and assuming political parties' ability to
intuit this, electioneering tactics involving the promise
of environmentally friendly issues are unlikely to be
effective, thereby making them unlikely to be offered and
certainly not implemented.
The second reason to expect that FPTP systems would
have worse environmental records is the marginalization
of small and single-interest parties. The role played by
large parties in FPTP systems is apparent enough that the
practically negligible role filled by special interests should
be self-evident. Even so, it is still helpful to mention the
relationship. The nature of FPTP systems tends to marginalize the effect that single issues can have in directly
affecting policy. Instead, they encourage lobbying groups
who certainly wield considerable clout in the fonn of financial contributions but do not take an active role in the
writing of or voting on policy. The difference we wish to
emphasize is that, in PR systems, special interest groups
are able to directly enter the political arena due to the
lower barriers of entry. They are able to fonn coalitions
and write and vote on legislation. This ability does not exist in FPTP systems relegating special interest groups to
mere lobbyist status. Therefore, almost any special interest group with significant power will, of necessity, be a
group with substantial financial backing. These groups are
likely to represent business interests because by definition
businesses have a larger pool of funding to work with, as
any money spent on lobbying can be seen as a financial
"investment." Environmental groups on the other hand
mainly rely on individual philanthropists and other donors
which are relatively parsimonious. 12 The following section will discuss the merits of a PR system due to its more
equitable incorporation of small parties and single issues.
It is also likely that policies in FPTP systems are
less stable than those elected through PRo FPTP parties
must polarize themselves from other parties in an etTort to
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attract voters, and they are not as likely to build coalitions
and compromise with other parties while they are in office.
Thus, they will vacillate among varying environmental
policies. which is ultimately harmful for the environment
because any positive gains during one term will most likely
be negated in the next term when another party is in power.
Because PR allows for more variance, it should allow for
more stable environmental policies and, therefore, higher
environmental performance.

Environmental Performance and PR Systems
It is unlikely that a single-issue group would be able
to enter the political arena in a FPTP system under the
guise of a viable party. Their influence is mostly limited
to lobbying and public-awareness campaigns, and their
effectiveness tends to be limited by their lack of resources.
It is much easier, however, for single-issue groups to effect
political changes in a PR system. In a PR system they have
a chance of gaining real political representation and power
rather than negotiating legislation as a lobbying consortium.
The makeup of a PR system, only a small percentage of
the total vote is necessary in order to gain a seat or two,
facilitates the entry and participation of parties with more
specialized interests. 13 Even though the heightened ease
with which these groups may gain legislative seats is
obvious, it might be tempting to question the efficacy with
which such a seemingly insignificant group could pursue
its agenda. The answer lies in a (PR elected) government's
need for consensus and coalition in order to avoid potential
conflicts and the ensuing impasses of gridlock. 14 This
quality of PR systems, the almost invariable requirement
for various parties to compromise and form a functional
government, is what allows special-interest parties (in
this case environmentally-minded parties) to wield
considerably more influence than they would in other
electoral systems. This creates an atmosphere of giveand-take in which environmental policies are likely to be
passed in return for support on an unrelated matter.
A second issue when considering the effect of the
electorate on environmental policies is the expectations
that voters are likely to have of their fellow voters.
Meltzer and Vellrath l5 note that the economy is the most
important determining factor when individuals decide on
a candidate, and most voters no doubt realize this as well.
Therefore, in a PR system, a voter who feels particular
concern for the environment will vote for a "green"
party without fearing that security or the economy will
be sacrificed, because the majority of the other voters
will determine their choice based on these issues. Our
voter will be secure in the knowledge that the majority
of his neighbors will not share his preoccupation with
the environment. thus facilitating the decision to vote for
a single-issue group and allow his neighbors to vote on
larger issues. 16 Therefore, relatively more people may

vote for single-issue "green" parties without fear of their
actually taking control of the legislature.
Some may argue that the type of electoral system as
related to environmental performance is in fact a spurious
correlation resulting from some sort of norms diffusion.
This result is unlikely, however, as there is no reason that
environmental norms and standards should have any relation to the electoral system adopted. We need only look at
areas where we might expect ideology to have been imparted or spread in order to realize that this is improbable.
For instance, all of Latin America was land colonized by
the Spanish and the Portuguese. Yet, when we analyze the
executive branches of the various governments, we find that
they have borrowed from the U.S model much more heavily than from the European model. 17 There are certain things
that can reasonably be expected to be passed on from one
country to another; English is the lingua franca of India;
besides the U.S., Japan and Cuba are the only countries in
the world that really care about baseball; and France's former colonies still make up a cultural and linguistic bloc.
However, Australia, Canada, and the U.S., all former British colonies, have widely disparate environmental attitudes,
despite their common heritage. As tempting and facile as it
would be to ascribe environmental performance to regional
ideologies, and to propose that electoral systems are just indicators of those ideologies, doing so would be inaccurate.
In this case, we see clear evidence for the rational choice,
institutionalist argument. We assert that it is specifically the
electoral process which not only causes more people to vote
for greener parties but also encourages politicians to legislate for better environmental protection.

Hypotheses
In an attempt to empirically test these causal relationships, we estimate two models using different measures of
PR versus FPTP. The variable of interest in the first model
is a dummy variable for PRo In this model we predict that
PR will have a positive effect on the Environmental Performance Index (EPI), and transparency will also have a
positive, although nonlinear, relationship to the EPI. We
predict that there may be decreasing returns to transparency, which will be shown by a negative coefficient on the
transparency-squared term. In other words:
• Hypothesis 1: PR will be positively correlated and statistically significant to the EPI.
• Hypothesis 2: Transparency will be positively and significantly related to the EPr.
• Hypothesis 3: Transparency-squared will be negatively
related to the EPI, showing decreasing returns to transparency's effect on environmental protection.
The second model will involve a measure of district
magnitude, which will more precisely estimate the effect
of PRo We expect this model to give us a result similar to
the coefficient on PR, that is:
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• Hypothesis 4: District magnitude will be positively and
significantly related to the EPI.
• Subsequent sections of this paper explain our methods
and evaluate the measures of each variable and present
the results.

Data
We aim to explore the causal relationship between environmental performance and the type of electoral system
through a quantitative analysis. While qualitative studies are
sometimes useful, a quantitative study allows us to expand
our number of cases and test our hypotheses cross-nationally. This allows for the development of more generalized
and applicable results. As the necessary data is available for
a fairly large selection of countries, we can test the effects
of electoral systems on a wide array of countries.
In combination with the theoretical framework, the
quantitative elements of our study build a convincing
case for causation. We control for any variables that may
indicate correlation rather than causation, such as, per
capita wealth, democracy, education, corruption, attitudes,
etc. Any relation we predict through the type of electoral
system is unlikely to be so highly correlated with another
variable that the results, instead, demonstrate the effects
of an alternate explanation. It is also highly unlikely that
there will be any problems with endogeneity, which is
most likely one of the causes of some kind of spurious
causal relationship as the coefficient on the explanatory
variable would be highly correlated with the error term.
There is no theoretical reason apparent to us that could
account for the level of environmental performance
influencing the type of political system. While it may
be possible that the type of electoral system reflects
the influence on an alternate electoral variable, such as,
open or closed list or the number of effective parties, the
theoretical reasoning behind the importance of electoral
system provides fairly strong evidence that this is unlikely
to be the case. Still, there is no definitive way to test
for causality versus correlation; thus, many empiricists
assert that while numerical analysis certainly provides
evidence of correlation, causation can be slightly more
elusive. IS Despite this, the case for causality is strong,
although mere correlation does not seriously undermine
our conclusions or policy implications. The text that
follows will outline the model selection, methodology,
and regression results. In combination with the theoretical
framework, these elements build a compelling case for
the importance of the electoral system in determining the
level of environmental performance.

Environmental Performance Index
As our dependent variable measuring environmental
performance, we use a very recently developed comprehensive dataset called the EPI.I9 Developed in 2006, it
involves a composite ranking theoretically between zero
50

and one hundred. The ranking quantifies the level of environmental performance with respect to the following two
overarching policy objectives: first, the environment as it
relates to human health, and second, ecosystem vitality
and natural resource management. These indicators are
purposefully linked to government environmental policy
rather than natural endowments, thus the indicators measure the effectiveness of preserving what endowments already exist rather than measuring the state of the environment at a given time. This measurement is more germane
to our study, as it evaluates the political factors and the
human impact on the environment rather than a more intangible measurement of sustainability.
The first core area of the EPI measures the environmental impact on health by looking at the influences of
environmental factors on morbidity and mortality rates.
This aspect of the measurement represents a fairly anthropocentric measure that is probably the least controversial measure of environmental standards. It includes
no assumption of the inherent value of the environment;
the indicators simply reflect natural human preferences
against disease and death. The indicators used, such as,
water supply, sanitation, and child mortality, are all incorporated by the Millennium Development Goals as part of
environmental objectives that are, for the most part, universally recognized. Two measures of air quality-urban
particulates and indoor air pollution-also factor into the
equation, as they have significant health implications.
Using slightly more complex and varied indicators
of environmental performance, the second core area of
the EPI measures ecosystem vitality and natural resource
management. Within this measurement is air quality,
estimated by the level of urban particulates and groundlevel ozone. A value for water resources was quantified
through measures of water consumption rates and
pollutants discharged into water bodies.
Government policy also receives attention in the
measurement of this second core area. Government
policies involving the maintenance of productive natural
resources are measured with a focus on how these policies
seek to protect natural resources versus exploiting them
for economic gain. In regard to biodiversity and habitat,
the indicators examine not only the percentage of land
designated as protected wilderness, but also the evenness in
the amount of protection accorded to various biomes. The
latter is important because the internationally recognized
goal of protecting at least 10 percent of a country's territory
may still result in grave ecological damage if the spread
of protection covers only a homogenous area. Finally, this
second core area uses a measurement of sustainable energy
created from data on energy consumption, the percentage
of total energy from a renewable energy source, and carbon
dioxide emissions per unit of GDP. This measurement
of environmental performance is one of the most
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comprehensive to date and is well tailored to the objective
of our study. The relevance of these measurements is that
they focus on government policies toward the environment,
not necessarily on their outcomes, which can reflect the
influence of numerous other factors.

Electoral System
For our main independent variable analyzing the
affect of the electoral system, we run regressions with two
different measures. We first use the World Bank's Political
Institutions dataset;"o it includes a dichotomous variable
for the use of proportional representation in the legislative
elections. A value of one indicates the presence of PR;
however, a value of one may also indicate a mixed system
in which voters determine a certain percentage of the
legislature through PR and the remainder through plurality.
This measure will tell us if the presence of PR, whether the
sole vote transfer mechanism or part of a mixed system, has
a significant effect on environmental performance.
We use district magnitude as the second measure
of electoral system, taken from Joel Johnson and Jessica
Wallack's Electoral Institutions and the Personal Vote
dataset. 21 They code district magnitude for both the average
district and the average legislator. The authors point
out the precision of the latter measure, as it controls for
exceptionally small or large districts. However, we choose
to use the measurement of the average district due to greater
availability of data. If a country has a district magnitude
of one, then it uses a FPTP system, whereas numbers
greater than one indicate the use of a PR system. This
measurement allows us to better nuance our argument and
separate electoral system effects, which helps determine
the incentives that politicians face. 22 Oue to the vote-to-seat
ratio, a country with an average district magnitude of two
or three will be much more similar to a FPTP system than a
country with an average district magnitude of fifteen. There
are a few outlying cases, and we exclude all cases where
district magnitude is greater than twenty-five. It is standard
practice to exclude any extreme variables, as they have a
tendency to skew results. With these qualifications in place,
the district magnitude measurement thus enhances our
ability to test the causal logic that PR systems allow smaller
parties that focus on a single issue, such as, the environment,
to have some representation in the legislature. Oistricts
that elect a higher number of representatives, thus having
a high district magnitude, provide more chances for small
parties to gain representation; whereas, districts that elect a
lower number of representatives, thus having a low district
magnitude, encourage parties and candidates that appeal to
a broad constituency and may discourage politicians and
parties from taking a strong stand on the environment.
Control Variables
Several factors combine to explain environmental
performance, and we attempt to control tor these factors

in order to accurately identify the effect of the main explanatory variable: PRo The environmental Kuznets curve
(EKC) is a popular, if controversial, explanation of the
level of environmental protection. The EKC is meant to
predict the relationship between environmental degradation and economic development as measured by GOP. As
a country begins to develop, the level of environmental
degradation increases until it reaches a certain point of
development, at which point environmental performance
then begins to improve; this relationship graphically forms
an inverted U-shape. According to Esty, the EKC can be
broken down into three effects: technique effects, composition effects, and scale effects. Technique effects arise when
greener technologies are developed; composition effects
are defined by a shift in consumption preferences toward
greener goods; and scale effects refer to higher degradation due to increased economic activity and wealth.23 The
EKC defines the relative relationship among these three
factors, with decreasing environmental degradation as a
consequence of composition and technique effects outweighing scale effects. The relative effects ofthese factors
indicate at which part of the EKC each country is located
and determines the environmental effects of growth. This
relationship necessitates that we account for the effects of
economic development. Thus, we include a measurement
of wealth in our model. We measure wealth as the per
capita GOP of a country, adjusted for purchasing power
parity. We take the log of GOP in order to reduce the right
skew of the data and normalize it. The log of GOP lets
us look at percent change rather than dollar differences in
GOP among countries, which will allow for more meaningful comparison.
Contrary to the theory set forth in the EKC, our data
actually estimates a linear relationship with respect to GOP
and environmental performance as measured by the EPI.
On account of the measurement of the EPI being somewhat
nonstandard and more related to the political mechanisms
for protecting the environment, a linear relationship seems
more plausible. While the theoretical backing on the EKC
is interesting and sometimes does explain certain cases,
several authors have challenged the EKe's assumptions
on the distribution of income and the effects oftrade,"4 and
its empirical validity.25
While education levels, as reflected by literacy rates,
may be strongly correlated to GOP, this variable addresses
development in a broader sense than simply an increase
in GOP. While the EKC generally addresses only the
relationship between GOP and environmental degradation,
the relationship may go beyond mere measurements
of wealth to include the level of development as the
definitive variable. Further, literacy will better address
the changes in a country that are more specifically related
to development. This variable could also measure any
changes in attitude that are not accounted for in the post51
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materialist index. While this index will estimate much of
the change in attitudes due to economic development, it
will not necessarily account for changes in attitude that
relate to greater exposure to environmental issues. The use
of the literacy rate as our education measurement accounts
for the level of education throughout the entire population,
which helps to eliminate the bias of social class and gender.
Literacy also accounts for the effects of various types of
education (e.g., informal, trade schools, etc.) increasing
the overall level of education, which formal enrolment
rates have difficulty capturing. Literacy skills will open
up the channels of communication and knowledge, where
even the ability to read a local newspaper could change
environmental attitudes at a more basic level. This
measurement then accounts for differences stemming
from development and changes in environmental attitudes
due to increased exposure.
Manus Midlarsk y26 demonstrates the positive effect
of democracy on environmental performance. Scholars
have also shown that environmental degradation has a disproportionate effect on certain segments of the population.
particularly the poorY Theoretically, democracies should
allow these disadvantaged sectors to better convey their
opinions and to better affect environmental outcomes. The
incentive for politicians to gain support, and thus votes,
should also impact the responsiveness of policy and performance in democracies. Autocrats who do not rely on a
broad constituency to derive power and authority are less
likely to care about conditions that do not directly affect
them, such as, environmental degradation. With a strong
theoretical backing and favourable empirical analysis, it is
imperative to include democracy as a control variable. We
measure it using the Polity IV dataset. 2~ This measurement
scores countries from zero to ten, with ten being the most
democratic. The rating is determined based upon four categories: competitiveness of political participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive.
We have also included a transparency variable to
determine the level of corruption in a country. First,
corruption will affect the way the political system
operates. High levels of corruption may impede the
voters' check on their politicians, as voters may be
prone to support a candidate due to bribery and favours
rather than platforms and promised policies. Voters may
not even cast their own votes, or votes may not all be
legitimately counted. The absence of voters who are able
to legitimately influence policy undermines the causal
logic that we have put forth, in which PR systems are
better able to incorporate small, single-issue parties into
the government. If corruption obstructs the channels of
democracy, then party platforms and issues may not have
a significant affect on voters' choices.
The concerns regarding corruption are particularly

salient in the consideration of environmental issues. As
previously addressed, business interest groups and labor
unions have significant resources available to them. In addition, big business may constitute one of the last groups
to embrace restrictions meant to protect the environment,
as such restrictions often lead to more expensive production costs and chip away at profits. In order to prevent
the implementation of protective environmental policies,
labor groups may draw on their deep pockets to convince
politicians to pursue a different policy. While "bargaining" may never disappear from the political arena, this
type of bribery will be less likely in a country with high
levels of transparency; therefore, transparency should be
positively related to the EPI.
We use the measurement of Transparency International to measure the degree of transparency in a country. Transparency International measures corruption on a
scale of zero to ten, with ten being the most transparent.
Transparency International 29 defines corruption as "the
abuse of public office for private gain," and uses surveys
to detennine perceptions of corruption in a given country. While Daniel Treisman points out that this does not
account for the experiences of the average citizen with
corruption, this study aims to understand corruption more
generally across the country and to compare levels crossnationally.30 Treisman also points out that the Transparency International ratings correlate strongly with other
cross-national measures of corruption; this correlation
allows for meaningful comparisons. It is important to
mention that we have also included a squared-tenn for
transparency. A look at the data reveals a curvilinear relationship between transparency and the EPI. The regression results when a squared term was not included indicated the need to account for this nonlinear relationship.
Statistical significance improves with the addition of a
squared term, allowing us to better predict the level of
environmental performance.
The causal logic that we put forth also necessitates
the inclusion of environmental attitude in our model. If
electoral systems are to have any affect on environmental performance it is through the means by which they
encourage politicians to appeal to their constituencies
and the way in which they capture voters' attitudes. 31
Whether citizens of a country generally support environmental protection, are indifferent to it, or do not
place it as a high priority that will affect the attention
given to the environment in the political arena. Ifvoters
do not care about the environment, then even the emergence of a party that focuses on environmental issues
may be unlikely, not to mention the likelihood of the
party's rise to power.
In any study, one finds great difficulty in accounting
for and predicting attitudes. Attitude discernment is
complex even with well crafted surveys and the high
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level of variance among populations makes it challenging
to obtain an accurate sample. The World Values Survey 32
no doubt faces these constraints. but still assembles the
most complete compilation of values and attitudes in
many countries. The World Values Survey asks a series
of five questions about the environment. but none seemed
to capture the overall value placed on environmentalism
and the level of environmental protection in the country.
In addition to this, the World Values Survey included
fewer measures of environmental attitudes than our final
measurement did; this reduced our total observations and
detracted from the significance of the analysis.
We turned instead to the two questions on the World
Values Survey that ascertain the presence of post-materialism, and subscribed to Ronald Inglehart's33 assertion that
as material needs are met, people then tum their focus to
non-material concerns. Several scholars 34 have shown that
environmentalism should be included as a post-materialist
value, and the degree of materialist values in a country
indicate or are at least strongly correlated with environmental attitudes. The post-materialist values indicator
combines answers from two questions (see Appendix), the
composite of which determines if a country is materialist
(a score of one). post-materialist (three), or a mix (two).
Thus, we expect to see a positive coefficient on this variable, as a higher value reflects the presence of post-materialist values. Again, while the inclusion of this variable
reduces the number of cases by about half, the theoretical
arguments for its inclusion are compelling.

Methods
We will test our hypotheses using an Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression. Our analysis includes fifty-five
countries. The limited availability of data on environmental attitudes creates the main limitation on the number of
cases we have included. However, we cannot ignore the
strong theoretical reasons to include environmental attitudes in our analysis, and so we proceed with a limited
number of cases. Our case selection also runs the possibility of bias due to the fact that there were disproportionately
more developed countries in our survey than there were
less developed countries than a random sample would generate; twenty-eight out of the fifty-five countries sampled
are members of the OEeD. This is most likely because the
World Values Survey is biased toward countries that are
more developed. possibly as a result oflower survey costs
due to existing infrastructure, less restrictive governments,
or communication barriers. In any case, the variables for
attitudes decreased our survey from ninety-eight observations to fifty-two observations, leaving out many developing countries and keeping in all members of the G-8 and
all but one of the OEeD countries (Luxembourg). Ifthere
is some inherent difference between these developed and
less developed countries this could bias our results. This

bias could be due to higher education that basic literacy is
unable to control for, some kind of nonlinearity with GDP,
or cultural differences that attitudes are unable to pick up.
Therefore, we attempt to control for this relationship between development (a broader definition of development
than income provides) and environmental performance
using a binary variable for OEeD membership. The summary statistics are included in Table 1 (page 54):
The data section discusses some of the challenges
encountered in this analysis. The reliance on the data collection of others always poses some concern, particularly
due to the risk ofmiscoded information. While most of the
data that we have used comes from fairly standard sources,
such as the World Bank and the Polity database, the survey data from Transparency International and the World
Values Survey may potentially be susceptible to these
problems. Survey research poses a problem in any field.
Problems can occur in the creation of the survey (certain
questions may produce biased answers), the execution of
the survey (communication problems, self-reporting. disinterested respondents), and the coding of the information
obtained through the survey. While both Transparency International and the World Values Survey are well executed
surveys and reputable sources. these challenges remain a
legitimate concern. Furthermore, extracting the attitudes
of an entire country on a polarizing issue like the environment always constitutes a formidable challenge.

Results
Dummy PR Variable
In order to accentuate the importance of our main
model and the findings on the significance of the
district magnitude. we have included the original model
using a dummy variable for PRo The variable is coded
one, if any type of PR system is in place, and zero, if
not. Based on the literature. we first predicted that PR
would have a significant and positive effect on the EPI.
Using this variable as a general measure of the many
theoretically positive effects of PR on the environment
(i.e., both the consistency argument and the special
interest group argument), this measure shows how the
identification of a country's political system affects its
environmental protection. This measure does not account
for the possibility of varying degrees of representation, or
differentiate between any theoretical causal mechanism.
Thus, we began our estimation using a binary for PR, and
the results are shown in Table 2.
At first, these results seemed to do a good job of
explaining the differences in environmental performance
among different countries. The R2 at 0.82 is high, meaning that the model explains approximately 82 percent of
the variation in the EPI. The remaining 18 percent may
be explained by variables that are not controlled for by
the model. or more likely may represent inherent vari53
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Range

Variable

Environmental Perfonnance
Index (EPI)
.. :{
Literacy
GDP per capita ".
LogGDP
.Democracy
Transparency
Transparency Squared
@
District Magnitude
Post-Mate.rialist Values

Median

Mean

Standard Deviation

Min.

Max

41.1

88

75.55

71.5 2

11.93

41.1

99

97.75

91.47

13.54

723

42,364

11 ,489

15,962.42

12,434.89

6.58

10.65

9.35

9.27

1.03

0

10

9

7.42

3.42

1.5

9.7

3.95

4.88

2.57

2.25

94.09

15.6 1

30.28

29.03

1

150

6.46

19.59

37.90

1

3

1

1.48

0.57

Table 2: Regression Estimates for Model Using Binary PR
R2= 0.82
Adj R2= 0.78

Variables
EPI

Coefficient

T-statistic

P-value

Intercept

14.1 2

-0.7 1

0.48 1

Literacy 200S

0.28

0.08

3.76

0.001

LogGDP

4.86

2.06

2. 36

0.023

Democracy

-0.59

0.39

-1 .53

0.132

Transparency

3. 13

2.47

1.26

0.213

Transparencyl

-0.20

0.19

- 1.06

0. 293

2. 15

0.63

0.530

BinaryPR

1.36

Attitudes

3.01

1. 70

1.77

0.084

OECO

1.52

2.68

0.5 7

0.572

ability. Overall, this is compelling evidence that the independent variables are well chosen and that the model
is valid.
These results correspond well to those estimated in the
second model, but there are some unexpected findings.
The variables for literacy, GDP, and democracy all have
fairly consistent estimates, and the significance does not
change between models. Literacy works well as a control
variable, as it is strongly correlated with environmental
protection, and GDP has a similarly predictable result,
as it is also significant and positive. Surprisingly, GDP
and literacy are the only statistically significant variables
at the .05 confidence level, yet the model overall holds
strong predictive power, which may indicate some degree
of multicollinearity.
Another similar red flag for multicollinearity is the
negative, statistically insignificant coefficient on democratic openness. This result would imply that greater
democratic openness and transparency leads to less environmental protection, yet the opposite result has been
empirically proven previously.35 Multicollinearity is often
54

Std. Error

-10.03

exhibited in strong overall estimation with few individually significant variables, and if multicollinearity is present
it can also predict the wrong signs for some coefficients.
Multicollinearity is likely the culprit behind this surprising prediction on democratic openness.
Democratic openness has proven to be highly correlated with education levels and GDP and is apt to be correlated with favorable attitudes toward the environment.
Citizens in a country that is more open to democracy, oftentimes, have greater opportunities for education beyond
basic literacy- these effects are not picked up by our literacy variable. Also, as democratic openness increases,
knowledge regarding global environmental problems may
be disseminated more quickly to the general public, as reflected by a freer press. These two effects could theoretically lead to some sort of correlation between democratic
openness and attitudes. Strong empirical support validates
a correlation between these variables.
The predictive power of democracy and attitudes
together is significant with an F-stat for democracy and
attitudes together as 2.58, yet neither coefficient is sig-
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through these and other tests we determined that the binary
PR value simply did not have the significant effect that we
had predicted. While at first disheartening, this makes the
results for the second model using district magnitude all
the more interesting.

nificant on its own at this high level. While the estimation
on democratic openness is unexpected, our model is still
valid and this estimate does not bias our main explanatory
variable in any way. While this model as a whole has good
explanatory power and lends legitimacy to our variable selection, the statistical insignificance of some of the results
reduces its validity.
This model estimates the level of transparency as
statistically insignificant. We expected transparency to
increase the level of environmental performance at a decreasing rate, so the model exhibits the expected signs;
however, the P-values are very high which really limits
the model's credibility. The estimation on attitudes also
presents a variable with the expected sign, but the results
are not significant. Surprisingly this significance changes
when a more precise specification of PR is used in the
next model. We will explore the potential reasons for this
change in significance, but first let us review our main explanatory variable and its effect in this model.
Initially, we predicted that the binary PR variable may
not be significant simply due to multicollinearity; therefore, we tested the correlation between democracy and
PR, as it seemed to have the most intuitive connection.
The correlation matrix is as shown in Table 3.
Because the PR and democracy variables exhibit some
degree of multicollinearity, we assumed that perhaps the
low and insignificant effect of PR was simply consumed
in the coefficient on democracy. However, looking at the
correlation matrix, we can see that democracy and PR are
not very highly correlated. Also, the F-stat on this variable is only 1.24, showing that both variables together do
not significantly predict the EPl. After analyzing the data

District Magnitude
In the second model, we estimated the effect of
PR using a different measurement, and found that it
significantly affected the EPl. In the second and most
important model (Table 5) the only modified variable is
that representing PR, changing from a binary to the number
elected to the legislature from each district. This model
more accurately estimates the degree of proportional
representation because as this district magnitude increases
it reflects the variance of the voters' preferences with
more precision. A higher number of seats also increases
the likelihood of smaller interest groups obtaining seats
in the legislature; this occurrence directly relates to one of
the theoretical reasons why PR matters. We hypothesized
earlier that a larger role for small interest groups facilitates
more "green" policies; hence, the number of members in
a district should lead to a significant, positive effect on
environmental protection. The estimates for this second
model are shown in Table 4.
We are correct in our hypothesis that the number
of members in the legislature elected from each district
is a more accurate predictor for the environment. Our
R2 increases by almost 5 percent while the number
of variables stays the same, showing that the overall
explanatory power increases. In terms of the control
variables, literacy and GDP still have a significant, positive

Table 3: Correlation Matrix for Democracy and PR

DemO<:
Democ

1.0

PR

0.397

PR

1.0

Table 4: Regression Estimates for Model Using Number of Members in a District
j

EPI

Rl:;:;: 0.839
Adj Rl= 0.81

-

Variables
Coefficient

Std. Error

T-statistk

P-value

Intercept

-16.6

12. 13

-1.37

0.178

Literacy_2005

0.23

0.07

3.18

0.003

LogGDP

5.63

1.80

3.12

0.003

Democracy

-0.45

0.33

-1.38

0.173

Transparency

4.42

2.41

1.83

0.073

Transparencyl

-0.33

0.19

-1 .69

0.097

Memberdist.

0.32

0.148

2.14

0.038

Attitudes

3.11

1.70

1.83

0.Q75

OECD

0.01

2.62

0.00

0.997
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effect on environmental performance, which confirms
previous research on the subject. The only real issue
with this model is the consistently unexpected sign of the
coefficient on democracy. The only thing that this could
mean is potential multicollinearity, but this does not pose
any problems with the rest of our estimates, as discussed
earlier. This model does, however, solve all of the other
difficulties in estimation with the previous model.
We can see that the magnitude and significance of
political attitudes increases with this model because we
have a more precise estimation of the role of special
interests. This is consistent with the belief that a greater
diversity of interests is represented with an effective PR
system, and thus, environmental attitudes matter more
in terms of policy. Environmental attitudes are better
represented in a PR system, and this can be seen through
more environmentally sound policies. Other control
variables also prove to be more significant in this model.
The coefficients on the transparency terms increase
in significance to the point that they are significant at
the 0.10 level. As Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini 36
have shown, PR actually has a slightly positive effect on
transparency and similarly, with a more precise measure for
PR, corruption matters more in our model. We hypothesized
that an increase in transparency would actuall y create better
environmental performance. Environmental amenities and
natural resources are important public goods that depend
on the right incentives for governments-incentives that
are skewed by comlption. Therefore, controlling for this
nonlinear relationship is important in proper estimation.
The coefficients on the transparency and the transparency-squared variables show the direction in which
transparency effects the environment, and then the rate at
which this effect is taking place (as it is nonlinear it will
not affect environmental performance at a constant rate).
The positive coefficient shows that at the mean, as transparency increases by one, the EPr is improved by 4.42,
and the estimate on transparency-squared shows that as
transparency increases, the rate at which it affects the EPr
is mitigated. Conceptually, this could result from the transparency variable scale being nonlinear in some way (that
is, a change from zero to one is larger than a change from
four to five), or because a relationship exhibiting decreasing returns exists between transparency and environmental
performance, or a combination of both these effects occurring simultaneously. The initial reductions in corruption
could matter a lot to environmental performance as the
conditions of anarchy and disorder (dumping environmental waste, bribing officials to bypass emissions standards,
etc.) are mitigated. Yet, after a certain point, reductions in
corruption are less dramatically related to the environment
(these increases in transparency would create better electoral processes, etc.). Most likely, decreasing marginal returns to transparency account for at least a portion of this
56

effect and, in addition to our main explanatory variable,
could have interesting practical implications.
Our dummy variable control for OECD countries
picks up an interesting and previously undiscussed effect in both models. We included this variable to limit any
selection bias because there are disproportionately more
OECD countries than a random sample would include.
This dummy variable controls for any inherent differences in environmental protection with respect to membership in the OECD versus non-membership, which
might pick up any shifts in environmental protection that
our control variables do not address. Our estimate is actually surprising because it shows no statistically significant
difference between these two groups. The only estimates
that change when we include the OECD dummy variable
are those for literacy and GDP. This means that the OECD
estimate is most likely picking up wealth and education
effects. Estimating the model with a control for G-8 membership rather than OECD membership actually predicts
the opposite effect, G-8 countries have worse environmental performance. However, this result is likely biased
by the u.s. and Russia, who are notorious for relatively
low environmental standards compared to other parts of
the developed world. Thus, we can be assured that our
model represents a robust predictor of environmental performance that guarantees the validity of the results on our
main explanatory variable.
Our main predictor is significant when measured
according to district magnitUde, where the binary variable
for PR versus FPTP is not significant. The measurement on
district magnitude more precisely estimates the likelihood
of a special interest group or party obtaining one or more
seats in the legislature. Where a one-member district is a
FPTP system and presents opportunities only for large and
established parties, single-interest parties are increasingly
likely to obtain seats in the legislature with a greater district
magnitude. The coefficient shows that when one more
member of the legislature is added from each electoral
district, the EPI increases by .32; this information confirms
our hypotheses that PR matters because of increased
opportunities to special interest groups.
While the coefficient on district magnitude may seem
insufficiently large to represent real, tangible change in
environmental performance, it is important to again look
at the measure of the EPI. The EPI measures environmental health, air quality, water resources, biodiversity
and habitat, productive natural resources, and sustainable
energy. While governments have a substantial influence
on environmental performance, there are nevertheless
constraints on both the policymaker's realm of influence
and natural factors. In addition to the control variables accounted for in this model, variability in the EPr can also be
explained by colonial heritage, pollution from external
sources where effects are distributed interspatially, deg-
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radation where effects are distributed intertemporally, international standards, or environmental shocks, specific
to each country. Hence, while the effect of district magnitude may initially seem insignificant, due to the variety
of complex determinants of environmental performance,
any political influence should be given due credit.

Conclusion
As our results show, the mere presence of a PR
system does not significantly influence a country's
environmental attitudes; rather, the district magnitude in
PR systems is the determining factor. These results are
important for two principal reasons. First, we are able to
access the inner workings of democracies as they interact
with policies and constituents. In this instance, the results
themselves are not as important as the fact that there are
results and that they show a noticeable difference in the
performances of democracies.
But why is this significant? The advantages of
democracies over non-democracies are so obvious and
so multitudinous that it becomes tempting to ignore the
differences among democracies for the facile contrast
between democratic systems and other systems. Too
often. dysfunctional democratic states are lionized for the
sheer fact that they are democratic instead of being offered
comparisons and suggestions from more functional states.
Along this same vein, non-democratic states are merely
urged to "democratize" without being offered specific
examples or methods to do so.
This research will help with states' attempts to improve their environmental records. This research shows
the importance of incorporating smaller groups into the
political arena and the effects that this will have on environmental policy. The implications of our study do not
limit themselves to improving environmental attitudes
or the study of electoral systems. This disparity among
democratic electoral systems and their environmental performance should be considered indicative of larger trends
within the study of democracies.
Following these results, research should be done to determine what aspects of democracies affect such vital issues
as women's rights, education, economic growth, or even
human rights, all issues whose representation in democracies is hardly equal. When this research is done, states will
be able to analyze the results and compare them against the
specific aspects of their governing systems. Thus, states
participating in human rights abuses will see what influences respect for human rights in other democracies, or
states that need to give more equal opportunities to women
will see what specific aspects of democracy have the most
positive correlation to women's rights. Furthermore, when
currently non-democratic states do decide to democratize,
they can look at the problems unique to their country, the
corpus of research devoted to those certain problems, and,

then, choose to implement democratic systems designed
specifically to target those problems.
The second significant part of our research is the
proven desirability of the integration of interest groups
into the political arena in a way that is not driven entirely
by money. The obvious differences between systems
with low district magnitude. or FPTP systems, and PR
systems with high district magnitude highlight the role
that special interest groups play in the political system,
specifically, the role that they are allowed to play and
the effects they are allowed to have as determined by
the limiting factors of the electoral system. The positive
effects of an increased participation by special interest
groups could easily translate to other areas of public policy or social needs. In addition to the increased role of
special interest groups, the interaction between financial
contributions from these groups and favorable legislation passed for them might be drastically reduced. As
money gradually becomes less significant, confidence in
the government is likely to grow and democratic institutions are likely to be strengthened.
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Electing Justice Book Review
Tim Taylor
rofessor Richard Davis's book Electing Justice: Fixing the Supreme Court Nomination Process leaves
its readers informed, frustrated, and overwhelmingly
surprised by the all-too political process surrounding the
nomination and confirmation of Supreme Court Justices.
The book is great history, unfurling the progression of
court appointments from staid congressional duty to media frenzy with a good, if not excellent, balance of narrative, analysis, and anecdote. While the crux of Davis's
response to the politicization of judicial nomination-that
we should elect the Supreme Court Justices-may sound
radical at first glance, his actual proposal is nuanced and
(dare I say it?) practicable. Not all readers will be convinced that American citizens ought to elect justices, but
the book's argument is refreshing and admirably serious.

P

Summary
The book's introduction, and best section, is a frustrating position paper. Here, Davis unapologetically makes
his case:
Particularly in the last quarter century or so, we have
transformed the judicial selection process into one with
all of the trappings of an electoral campaign but without
the key players-the electorate. This is an untenable
situation-a reality that looks only vaguely familiar
to the formal structure designed for it more than 200
years ago and a process that no longer reflects reality. I
I say this chapter is frustrating because we do not want
to believe what he has to say, but the evidence he provides is convincing. He begins by dispelling the myth
that judicial nominees are selected for their merit alone.
While competence matters, a plethora of senators have
expressed that candidates with philosophies far from the
Senate's philosophy will "be in for a rough ride."c Thus,

it is important for presidents to "sell" their nominees; in
response to the president's salesmanship, forces both for
and against the nominee mobilize in hopes of influencing
the Senate. However, the power of these forces-the media, interest groups, and public opinion-has multiplied
in the last fifty years. These external players, who are not
constitutionally enumerated, are here to stay, and the judicial selection process must be restructured to adapt to
this new reality, says Davis. The battles waged over the
confirmations of Justices John Roberts and Samuel Alito
prove Davis correct: the process is political, and external
forces are not only refusing to disappear, but growing in
strength. For idealists of the judicial branch these revelations are, indeed, frustrating.
The book's first full chapter, "Traditional Versus New
Players," details the constitutional and extra-constitutional
roles of each branch of government in the judicial process
and also the rise of new players: interest groups, the news
media, and public opinion. For a presidency, a Supreme
Court nomination has far-reaching ramifications: nominees
may shift the court right or left, boost a president's image
among moderates or his core constituency, and serve as
a barometer of the relative strength of the presidency
to the Senate. As for the Senate, its pendulum between
quiescence and assertiveness currently swings towards
assertion. Even so, senators must take pains to avoid
appearing either belligerent or political. Finally, the
judiciary affects the process through timed retirements and
their activity on the bench. Beyond these constitutional
forces, new actors are affecting the selection process,
and they are doing so strongly and on every nomination,
rather than just occasionally. Unlike in the past, nominees
are now subjected to extensive scrutiny of both their
professional and private lives. Interest groups lobby both
59
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for and against nominees on strictly ideological grounds,
and constituents are encouraged to pressure their senators
one way or the other. Davis argues that the growing
politicization of the selection process has less to do with
ideological presidents or confrontational senators, and
more to do with the excesses of these new players. To that
end, the role of these new players, especially the public's,
ought to be recognized, legitimated, and regulated.
The book's next chapter provides a history of judicial
selection, demonstrating that it has always had a political element. Presidents choose meritorious candidates, but
they also choose candidates who mirror their personal ideology, who are personal friends, and who represent certain
ethnic, religious, or gender groups. Presidents' decisions
are further influenced by advisors, senators, and current
court members. The Senate's reaction to nominees is influenced by its partisanship, its relationship with the president, the timing of the nomination, and the nominee him/
herself. What is most noteworthy, Davis demonstrates, is
that the time required for confirmation of nominees has
markedly increased in the last thirty years.
In chapter three, Davis argues that the conditions for a
more public, protracted, and altogether broken court selection process were in place by the Reagan administration.
Congress was resurgent, the Supreme Court was fresh off
many policy-making decisions involving salient issues
like abortion, school prayer, and racial integration, and the
media's resources and appetite had grown considerably.
While Robert H. Bork's Senate conflagration is typically
seen as a turning point, Davis argues, it is viewed as such
only because the conditions for it were set. Since Bark, the
incentives for expanding the fight have remained and so
wiIl the broken process.
Davis shows in chapter four how the new players affect judicial selection. First, are the interest groups. They
reinforce the concept of "litmus tests" for nominees and
lobby senators; more powerfully, though, they have become institutionalized in the selection process, with group
representatives testifying during hearings. The press scrutinizes candidates, often doggedly, and revs up public
interest in nominees. Whether rightfully or not, the press
fain plays up the drama of judicial selection. Finally, the
public is playing a larger role in the process, even though
the Constitution's original intent specifically prohibited it.
Public opinion poIling and its consequent leverage has its
influence on the Senate.
Given the influence of public opinion, the White House,
Senate, and interest groups all labor to create a suitable image of each nominee. The presidency has the advantage of
surprise in announcing a nominee, but opposition groups
quickly marshal their opposition. Then, the battle for the
identity of the candidate is waged through the media. Sometimes, the White House wins, for example, when it successfully sold Clarence Thomas as a rags-to-riches personifi60

cation of the "American Dream." Other times, opposition
forces win, such as, when the public became convinced that
Bork truly was out of the mainstream. In either case, the
media can be relied upon to foment the conflict.
After tracing the history and current problems of the
selection process, Davis offers bold recommendations
to repair it. He scolds presidents for nominating justices
according to certain political or ideological themes; he
scolds the Senate for treating confirmation hearings as
high theatre rather than serious deliberation; and he scolds
nominees for being less-than forthright in their testimonies.
However innocuous, his strongest reform is for the public:
"Since ... the public already is involved as a player, one
possible reform is to formalize that involvement by allowing
the public to participate in the selection of justices."3 He
suggests term limits and the regular election of new justices
by a plebiscite of nominees already confirmed by the Senate,
competitive election among potential nominees submitted
by the president. or by other limited means. He submits the
democratizing trend of American politics and the election
of state justices as powerfill precedent. Whether or not one
agrees with his proposal, his argument in this chapter is
careful and serious.

Evaluation of Methodology
Systematic study of the Supreme Court is difficult for
one overwhelming reason: a small sample size. That is,
with the court only rotating in a new justice every two
years, on average, it is challenging to develop models
that both explain and predict the behavior of presidents,
Congress, nominees, and extra-constitutional players,
simply because there are few real world observations to
base those models upon. From the court's inception, in
1789, to the present day, only 110 justices have occupied its
bench (108 at the time Electing Justice was written). This
contrasts starkly with the data available to congressional
scholars, who have 535 members to observe, with many
of them changing every two years. It is in even greater
contrast with behavioral political scientists or pollsters
who typically judge one thousand as the magic number of
observations necessary for analysis.
As Davis's observations are truncated in quantity, they
are also elongated in time, further compounding difficulty.
He argues that there has been a fundamental shift in the role
of public opinion, media, and interest groups in the selection process over the last quarter-century. Yet, his argument
must be based on only a few select instances, specifically,
the nomination of William Rehnquist to chief justice and
the subsequent confirmation battles from Antonin Scalia to
Stephen Breyer. Thus, the number of relevant observations
to Davis's argument is exceptionally small.
To address this problem, Davis first expands the study
by, in the words of Robert A. Dahl, "quantifying when
he can and qualifying when he must." Davis produces
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convincing figures that something truly has broken in
the Supreme Court nomination process: the nomination
process takes significantly longer, nominations are
featured more often in major print and television media,
and opposition groups are featured more prominently in
those media spots. Electing Justice is a slim volume, and
it could benefit from additional quantitative information.
Specifically, he tracks the growing influence of the media,
but few numbers are given to support the assertion that
interest groups and the public are becoming increasingly
involved. Have senators actually received more constituent
calls regarding nominations since the 1970s? Have groups
poured more money into the fight? Data on these and
similar questions would be an improvement.
Although Davis does not expand on quantitative
information, he does assemble his qualitative evidence
nicely. His particular gift for narrative shines as his
volume seamlessly incorporates anecdotes, news reports,
scholarly assessments, and expert opinion. Together, this
forms a comprehensive account of the last thirty years
of Supreme Court selections, and every relevant detail is
included. In the book's acknowledgements, he includes
his debt to several current justices, senators, and officials
for their interviews and candor.
While Davis assembles his observations well, his explanation falls short. Electing Justice's theoretical underpinnings are underdeveloped, and the main causal mechanism
he uses to explain the increasingly participatory nature of
the Supreme Court selection process is inadequate. While
reasonable, its explanatory power is limited. Given the incentives for increased participation, why was the fight not
joined until roughly the 1970s? And if appeals to a larger
group increase an interest's chance of success, why do politicians more often decry the politicization of the process
rather than embrace it? And given the theory's suggestion
that the conflicts will inevitably increase in size, then why
have some later confirmations, such as those of Ruth Ginsburg and Breyer, been relatively quiet?
This criticism of theory is a minor complaint. The
organization of the book does clearly layout what has
happened to the selection process, and why it is of a lesser
concern. Again and again, and impressively, Davis iterates
that it did happen, and fixing the process is his point.

Justice by Consent?
Electing Justice's argument leaves the reader either
sharply opposed or vigorously supportive. Its central
premise-the current judicial selection system is essentially participatory for all but the electorate-cannot be
denied prima facie. However, its central conclusion-the
government ought to legitimate the electorate by including it in the selection system-can be.
Davis deserves credit for advancing a controversial
idea. He deserves even more credit for suggesting

proposals that are altogether serious. It would be far
more incredulous than bold for Davis to call for open,
presidential-style elections of Supreme Court Justices.
Thus, his courage lies in the modest reforms he advances.
They are compelling-perhaps, dangerous to some
minds-because they are realistic.
Nonetheless, I remain unconvinced. Given the
evidence the book brings forward, there is little reason
to believe that more fully including citizens in judicial
selection will alleviate its current politicization, nor is
there assurance that electing the Supreme Court would not
bring problems worse than those of the current system.
In the initial moment, it seems the election route is a
bow to reality, a giving up. The book argues that, in regard
to the unprecedented media and interest group attention
given to judicial nominees since the 1970s, the "genie cannot be put back in the bottle." Maybe it cannot, but is the
only option total acquiescence? Instead, I would suggest
that much of the furor of recent confirmations is less because of the media's growing appetite-though it is substantial and has substantially affected all three branches
of government-and is more a consequence of an overly
ambitious late twentieth century Court, particularly during
the Thomas Berger years.
It is difficult to study the Supreme Court in this sense
because its members change at a glacial pace. Nonetheless,
it is indisputable that the Court's sweeping reforms in the
1960s and 1970s, and incremental reverses from the 1980s
through 2007, have raised the profile of the Court in the
public consciousness. The strongest example of this is Roe
v. Wade. Unlike many other decisions, such as Brown v.
Board or Gideon v. Wainwright, which were controversial
at their time but have since become accepted, Roe v. Wade
remains stubbornly unresolved, a fifty-fifty issue in 1973
and a fifty-fifty issue in 2007. Abortion has become the de
facto judicial litmus test, evidenced well enough by Electing
Justice's compilation of most-quoted interest groups during
confirmation hearings: NARAL, Planned Parenthood, and
National Right to Life are three of the top five. Abortion
has drawn millions of-probably-previously apathetic
citizens into the Supreme Court debate.
The activist Court of the 1960s and 1970s drew
further attention from citizens as it struck other previously
unmolested nerves: affirmative action, flag burning, and
student rights. So many decisions, handed down then
to protests and cheers, remain raw wounds or protected
treasures to differing groups. Conciliation has not
occurred, so the Court's stakes remain high. Thus, the
public has primed the media for increased attention to
judicial confirmations, not the other way around.
Democratization of the Supreme Court, whether by
one of the modes suggested by Davis or another, is an attractive alleviant, particularly to those who feel they have
been ill-served by the Supreme Court. Election dynamics
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suggest that presidents would be forced to nominate centrist rather than ideological nominees. Therefore, the logic
goes, the Supreme Court will not make polarizing decisions,
and the people will finally get the decisions from the Court
that they wanted all along. The public will be pleased further
as its role in the process is legitimated, in contrast to today,
where the public influences judicial selection only indirectly
through senatorial pressure and interest group leverage. In
short, public empowerment will cleanse both the selection
process and the Supreme Court.
Unfortunately, democratizing the judicial selection
process will muddy the Supreme Court like nothing else.
Davis correctly notes that the selection process does
"have all the trappings of an electoral campaign,"4 but
sloganeering and stump speeches alone do not democracy
make. The whole point of the "trappings" is to advertise
the consequences of an official's election or rejection.
There is no election without expectation.
And what would expectation mean for an elected
Supreme Court? Why, just what its agitators on the right
and left want-a Court of preclusion, one that has made its
rulings before taking the bench. In this Court, the public's
desire is legitimated by its role as elector, and the added
pressure may force its justices to bow to opinion polls rather
than justice. The alternative is for the Court to alienate the
public to a degree it could not without election, which would
result in more polarization, more rancor, and more power
to special interests. Electing Justice says much about a
judiciary that is both accountable and independent. I cannot
see these two ideals as anything but contradictory.

Conclusion
Electing Justice is a fabulous history, studious, incisive, well-documented, and refreshing. Davis deserves
tremendous credit for shedding light on how the Supreme
Court selection process has changed and for proposing a
remedy to its current system.
The book's most valuable use may be as a guide to the
future. The nomination and confirmation battles of Justices
John Roberts and Samuel Alito fit the book's models extremely well and confirm the permanent and powerful role
of the media, interest groups, and the public in the selection process. A second edition of the volume accounting
for these two selections would be most welcome. As the
Court's recent rulings on school integration, campaign advertising, and other issues demonstrate, the judicial branch
is alive, well, and as powerful as ever. Davis's work is a
valuable contribution to understanding the judicial branch's
power and to encouraging its proper use.
NOTES
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